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THE VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES: A REPORT ON THE
BREAKOUT SESSIONS AT THE 2005 NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON APPELLATE JUSTICE
Arthur D. Hellman*
“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently
there.”1 Certainly judges and lawyers did many things
differently in 1975, the year of the first National Conference on
Appellate Justice. They carried out legal research by poring over
digests and reporters, not by scrolling down a screen and
following a hyperlink. They dictated briefs and opinions for
their secretaries to type rather than drafting their work on
personal computers. They communicated by letter and
telephone, not email. They waited days or even weeks before
they could read a new Supreme Court decision. And when
attending a conference, they had to stand in line at a pay phone
to call their offices.
The political and societal setting was also different.
Richard Nixon had recently resigned as President in the wake of
the Watergate scandals. With the signing of the Helsinki
accords, Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe seemed more firmly entrenched than ever. Only fifteen
percent of the newly graduated law students were women. CNN
and Fox News did not exist, and talk radio was in its infancy.
One thing that has not changed since 1975 is the function
of appellate courts. Today, as in the past, that function is
twofold: to correct error or unfairness in the work of subordinate
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of Pittsburgh School of Law Class of 2008, for research assistance. For additional acknowledgments, see infra notes 3 and 10.
1. L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between 3 (Stein and Day 1967) (originally published 1953).
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tribunals and to publish opinions that will serve as precedents
for the decision of future cases.
How have the changes in technology, society, and politics
affected the way in which appellate courts carry out the tasks of
review for error and lawmaking? That is one of the questions
that led four prominent legal organizations to sponsor the 2005
National Conference on Appellate Justice.2 An important part of
the Conference was the breakout sessions in which small groups
of judges and lawyers discussed specific issues about the
operation of the appellate system. Each group had a discussion
leader—a distinguished judge or an experienced appellate
lawyer—who was primed to pose questions to the participants to
elicit their own perceptions. Each group also had a Reporter—a
prominent academic—who was prepared to report the
responses.3 The reports were submitted (some with remarkable
promptness!), and they fill a very large three-ring binder. In this
Conference Report, I present a summary and synthesis of the
main points that emerged from the discussions.4 To set the stage,
I will say a few words about the planning and organization of
the 2005 Conference, with emphasis on what might be called (in
Hollywood fashion) the 1975 prequel.
I. A TALE OF TWO CONFERENCES
The first National Conference on Appellate Justice was
organized by a group called the Advisory Council for Appellate
Justice. The Advisory Council was an ad hoc group composed
of some of the most eminent figures on the appellate scene.
Most of its members were lawyers and judges (state and
federal), not academics. What prompted the 1975 Conference
was a widely held belief that the nation’s appellate courts—and
2. For a more detailed account of the planning and organization of the 2005 Conference, see Arthur J. England, Jr., Planning and Conduct of the National Conference, 8 J.
App. Prac. & Process 65 (2006).
3. I take this opportunity to express my deep thanks to the discussion leaders and the
Reporters for their dedicated efforts that made this Conference Report possible. The thorough and thoughtful work of the Reporters is reflected on every page of the Report. A
complete list of the discussion leaders and the Reporters will be found in the Appendix.
4. The depth and breadth of the discussions in the thirteen groups were truly impressive. To keep this Report within reasonable length, many interesting topics and insightful
comments had to be left on the cutting-room floor.
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particularly the federal appellate courts—had reached a state of
crisis.
There is ample evidence of this perception. The leading
academic study at that time, published in 1974 and distributed to
participants in the 1975 Conference for background reading, had
the title Appellate Courts: Staff and Process in the Crisis of
Volume. The author was Professor Daniel J. Meador, already
one of the foremost scholars of appellate systems. The foreword
was written by Justice Louis Burke, a member of the California
Supreme Court and president of the National Center for State
Courts. Justice Burke referred to “the present serious crisis in
this country’s appellate courts.”5
As other Conference materials make clear, this assessment
actually rested on two complementary concerns. One is captured
by the title of Professor Meador’s book: the crisis was a crisis of
volume, and the concern centered on the effect of volume on the
process of deciding appeals. The Conference preview
summarized this theme in its opening pages:
The situation which calls for a National Conference on
Appellate Justice is the staggering inflation in caseload
which besets the appellate courts in the United States. . . .
Spreading the efforts of a limited number of judges over a
growing number of cases will threaten the quality of the
process by making the work of the judges less open and
visible, and hence less subject to account, or by increasing
a tendency toward delegation of more aspects of judicial
work and toward an appellate process that is less humane
6
and more bureaucratic in character.

But there was a second theme as well: The surge in the
volume of appeals posed a threat not only to the quality of the
process, but also to the value of uniformity—the “harmonious
and uniform administration of the law.”7 The concern embraced
state as well as federal courts. As early as 1965, Professor
Geoffrey Hazard expressed the fear that further expansion of the
California appellate system would convert “once authoritative
5. Louis Burke, Foreword, in Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Courts: Staff and Process
in the Crisis of Volume vii (West Pub. Co. 1974).
6. Advisory Council for Appellate Justice, Appellate Justice 1975: Materials for a
National Conference vol. I (Summary and Background) at 1, 3 (Nat. Ctr. for St. Cts. & Fed.
Jud. Ctr. 1975) [hereinafter Appellate Justice 1975].
7. Id. at 3.
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appellate tribunals . . . into a judicial Tower of Babel.”8 And a
few months after the 1975 Conference, the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska
Commission) issued its final report recommending creation of “a
new national court of appeals, designed to increase the capacity
of the federal judicial system for definitive adjudication of
issues of national law.”9
At the same time, what stands out in the materials for the
1975 Conference is something that is not there. There is no
discussion of the interaction between appellate courts and other
institutions of government, nor is there any reference to the
effect on appellate courts of the political and societal conflicts of
the era. Rather, the 1975 Conference treated the appellate court
system as a self-contained universe that existed largely
independent of political and social controversies.
Viewing the appellate scene of today against the
background of the 1975 Conference, the Steering Committee for
the 2005 Conference identified three broad topics for discussion
in the breakout sessions.10 First, there was the overarching issue
raised by the apparent assumption of the 1975 planners that
appellate courts carry out their work in isolation from the
political and social conflicts of their time. No one today would
accept that picture, but has immersion in controversy changed
the way appellate courts carry out their business? That is a
different, and more difficult, question.
The second topic centered on precedent and appellate
structure. In sharp contrast to 1975, concern about disuniformity
in appellate decisions barely registers on the seismometer of
legal discourse today. This is particularly remarkable at the
federal level, in view of the fact that the only tribunal with
8. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After the Trial Court—The Realities of Appellate Review,
in The Courts, The Public, and the Law Explosion 60, 81 (Harry W. Jones ed., PrenticeHall 1965). He added: “The proliferation of utterances could divest any one of these [intermediate appellate] courts of significant authority.” Id.
9. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 208 (1975) [hereinafter
Hruska Commission Report].
10. The planning of the Conference was a truly collaborative effort. I cannot improve
on Arthur England’s description of the Steering Committee: “a collection of very bright,
able, dedicated, and convivial appellate specialists with whom it was a delight to work intimately.” England, supra n. 2, at 69.
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authority to resolve conflicts with nationally binding effect—the
Supreme Court of the United States—has actually reduced its
decisional output to half of what it was in 1975.11 Is this a
problem? And what about uniformity in state systems? Those
were among the questions we asked the participants to address.
Finally, there were the issues of volume, process, and
delegation of responsibility that Professor Meador and others
were writing about in the 1970s. Since then, although the
volume of appeals has continued to increase, the sense of crisis
has almost entirely disappeared. There is little outcry over the
appellate shortcuts that aroused so much dismay in 1975. We
see occasional vigorous debates about particular aspects of the
appellate process—in particular, about rules prohibiting the
citation of unpublished opinions—but except for one or two
academics, no one is arguing that the system needs fundamental
change.
In the pages that follow, I summarize the discussions in the
breakout groups on each of these three topics. As one would
expect, the focus was on today’s practices and problems;
comparisons with the past were only secondary. Nevertheless,
the contrast between the preoccupations of 1975 and those of
2005 provides a useful framework for the Report.
Throughout this Report I use quotation marks for
comments by participants. These comments should not be taken
as verbatim transcriptions of what was said. The words have
been filtered through the reports of the individual Reporters,
and, in addition, have been edited for clarity and to avoid
identifying the speaker.12 Nevertheless, use of the quotations
preserves some of the immediacy and the informality of the
small-group setting. Moreover, I use “quotations” only when the
Reporter’s account appears to reflect a direct quote or close
paraphrase.13

11. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 403 [hereinafter Hellman, Shrunken Docket].
12. As Reporter for the Conference, I made a commitment to the participants that I
would not attribute any comments to particular individuals. Out of caution, I have generally
eliminated references that would identify the state or court of the speaker.
13. It is possible that in editing for clarification, I have inadvertently changed or distorted what the speaker intended to say. I apologize to any participant whose comments
have been mangled in any way.
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II. APPELLATE COURTS AS FLASHPOINTS OF CONTROVERSY
When Justice William O. Douglas retired late in 1975, his
successor, John Paul Stevens, took his oath only three weeks
after President Ford announced the nomination. It is hard to
imagine such a quick succession happening today. Appellate
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have
become flashpoints of controversy. In the legislatures, in the
media, and on the campaign trail, appellate decisions receive
attention and, often, harsh criticism. The public position of
appellate courts played no part in the 1975 Conference, but in
2005 the subject generated extensive discussion.
A. Tensions between Courts and Legislatures
One prominent manifestation of the controversial position
of appellate courts today is the tensions that have developed
between courts and legislatures. To be sure, the phenomenon is
by no means universal. In some states, as Conference
participants reported, “the relationship between legislative and
judicial branches is relatively harmonious.” But harmony
appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
In jurisdictions across the country, legislators have
threatened—or have actually undertaken—to retaliate against
appellate courts for their decisions on controversial issues. The
issues and the forms of retaliation span the spectrum. Here are
some examples reported by participants:
•

State A: The state supreme court, controlled by
members of one political party, issued a decision in a
redistricting case declaring unconstitutional a statute
passed by the legislature, which was controlled by
the opposite party. The legislature retaliated by
denying the courts the resources they need.

•

State B: The relationship between the legislature and
the courts is very tense, in large part because of
school-funding decisions that have forced the
legislature to appropriate more money for schools
than it wants to. The relationship was further
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aggravated by abortion decisions that were more
liberal than those of the U.S. Supreme Court and by
death-penalty decisions that favored defendants. As
a result, there is growing legislative opposition to the
“yes-no” method of electing judges, and proposals
for more partisan judicial elections may gain
strength.
•

State C: There is a real crisis between the judiciary
and the legislature. Judges do not get a salary
increase unless the legislature approves, and it has
been seven years since the last increase. Last year, a
controversial supreme court justice was up for
retention, and the speaker of the state house, who is
at the other end of the ideological spectrum, ran an
unsuccessful campaign to unseat him. The speaker is
now proposing changes to undermine the nonpartisan
court plan.

•

State D: A legislative committee recently
recommended a $9000.00 pay raise for trial court
judges, but no raise for appellate court judges. The
recommendation was made at a time when there were
many letters published in the state’s newspapers
denouncing judicial activism.

•

State E: A ruling allowing a lesbian to adopt a child
prompted a huge political controversy. There were
efforts to impeach the judge who had written the
decision.
The situation ended with a strong
reaffirmation of the need for an independent
judiciary, but it was still a very contentious situation.

Apart from specific hot-button issues, participants pointed
to a number of developments that contribute to tensions between
courts and legislatures. Here are the Reporters’ summaries from
two of the groups:
•

All participants in the group agreed that appellate
courts have become the focal point of political
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controversy. As courts have weighed in on matters of
social policy, there has often been a backlash in the
media and, not infrequently, legislative bodies.
There was a general sense among participants that
judicial decisions will remain controversial, and
judges targets for politically motivated attacks, as
long as judges are required to decide controversial
issues of public policy.
•

Several state court judges noted that in the
appropriations context, the judiciary “is just another
agency, not the third branch of government.” There
was general agreement with this “another agency”
legislative vision of the judiciary. State court judges
stated that there was much tension between
legislatures and the courts, and it causes judgeships
to go unfilled and the courts to be underfunded.

Other participants called attention to the effect of “the
national information grid” on legislative concerns. A state judge
described the phenomenon and its consequences:
One of the differences in the criticism and distrust that
judges experience today is that the national information
grid, from talk radio to evening cable shows to electronic
access to journal articles and so on, causes the things that
any appellate court does to bounce around the country in a
way that’s exponentially greater than what it was ten years
ago. If the Massachusetts court writes an opinion on gay
marriage, people huddle in party caucuses in my statehouse
to discuss whether our judges are the sorts that would do
this, and should we try to pass a constitutional amendment
now. That just didn’t happen in an earlier age because the
country moved more slowly.
So among the political branches it isn’t just worries about
any individual appellate court; they worry about all of
them. When the Ninth Circuit says “under God” has to
come out of the Pledge, it’s instant news everywhere. And
the public is even less likely than the elected officials to
differentiate between the Ninth Circuit and their state
supreme court.
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One particular development was emphasized by
participants from at least half a dozen states: the decline in the
number of legislators who are lawyers. As one state judge
commented, “The natural constituency of the judicial branch has
been shrinking.” This has had unfortunate consequences for the
judiciary, including the appellate courts. “The legislators lack
professional understanding of the role of the courts.” “The
change becomes very significant when the courts approach the
legislature with needs.” “At least in theory, lawyers should
understand the need for a strong, independent judiciary and
should be able to look at a ruling in a case as the product of
more than simply the policy preferences of the judges.”
One judge perceived a more subtle consequence. “In my
experience, the non-lawyer members of the legislature need help
dealing with the arguments of the lawyer legislators who have
agendas that they want to advance.” This comment was unique;
it would be interesting to know whether others have had that
experience.
Participants also cited the effect of legislative term limits.
In one state, “term limits have removed many legislators who
had built a strong relationship with the courts.” As a result, “the
legislature is increasingly made up of “high-turnover 30somethings who have no feel for what the judicial system is
about.”
How can appellate courts combat misunderstanding or
hostility on the part of legislators? Judges from several states
offered a variety of suggestions and described a number of
successful initiatives:
•

State A: “There are a few glimmers of hope. Judges
have worked with the state bar to encourage lawyers
to run for office, and judges have had some success
in enlisting business leaders to come to the defense
of a nonpartisan court plan.”

•

State B: “The supreme court’s rulemaking power
provides an opportunity to build a stronger
relationship with the legislature. The court asked the
legislature to set the policy and indicated that the
courts would provide the procedure. The legislature
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was so pleased with the process that it gave the
courts money to carry out the plan.”
•

State C: In response to retaliatory action by the
legislature, “the chief justice has enlisted business
leaders, lawyers, and others to come to the aid of the
judicial system.”

•

State D: “I suggest that we look at the situation as an
opportunity for the judges to educate themselves
about the legislature and for the judges to educate the
legislators about the courts. We have found that the
legislators are delighted to get a ‘back-stage’ tour of
the court. And our court has met in open meetings
with the legislators to discuss issues such as
legislative interpretation.”

Others spoke in more general terms: “We need to do more
to educate legislators, put them through a little bit of ‘law
school.’” “The relationship with the political branches is really
driven by the personality of the Chief Justice, who has an
important role to play in maintaining good political relations.”
B. Election of Judges
Election of judges has been part of American life since the
early nineteenth century. However, Conference participants
pointed to several recent developments that have exacerbated
concerns about politicization of the appellate judiciary.
First, as one lawyer observed, “special interest groups”
focus public attention on “single issues.” Many of these groups
send questionnaires to judicial candidates, and, as a judge
reported, “if one doesn’t answer, one gets a bullet on the website
indicating refusal to answer.”
Second, as participants in several groups noted, in 2002 the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White,14 holding that the First Amendment limits
the power of states to restrict speech by candidates for judicial
14. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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office. One judge said: “It is difficult to see how judges can
avoid political attacks when they stand for election (or retention)
just as legislators or other political candidates. If judges are to
stand for election, they are going to have to take positions on
issues, and their rulings will be fair game for campaign attacks.”
Third, judicial elections in many states have become very
costly. In one state, as much as $1,000,000 has been spent in the
campaign for a supreme court position. What makes this
troubling, of course, is that the candidates raise money from
lawyers.
Does the prospect of having to run for reelection or
retention affect the way appellate judges carry out their work? A
few judges saw evidence that it does. Said one: “The deepening
perception that judges decide cases in accord with their personal
feelings compromises the way that judges do business.” But the
majority of comments were to the contrary. As one judge
observed, in a comment echoed by others, “Judges do what they
think is right without worrying about reelection.”
But even if judicial elections do not affect courts’
decisions, they may have other unfortunate consequences. Over
the long term, hotly fought campaigns can have a negative effect
on the way citizens view courts. The prospect of having to run
for election may deter good people from seeking or accepting
judicial positions. For example, in one state, the judicial
selection commission now asks candidates “whether they have
the stomach to run a campaign after they have been on the bench
or whether they will bail out on the governor who appointed
them.” In another state, according to one participant, a person
who is hostile to the death penalty could not be elected to the
bench.
C. Media Coverage and Public Perceptions
Public response to appellate decisions cannot be considered
apart from coverage in the media, for the former is heavily
influenced by the latter. But as one participant observed, “while
the amount of attention [given by the media] has increased
significantly, the amount of insight has not. The increased
attention to the courts presents a great opportunity, but the
opportunity is being wasted by coverage that is superficial.”
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Several participants lamented the quality of media
coverage. Judges and lawyers in one group agreed that the
media frequently make mistakes in reporting about cases
because of the need to “dumb it down.”
One phenomenon that generated discussion in several
groups is the media’s practice of regularly identifying the
political affiliation or appointing president of the judge who
wrote a newly issued opinion. A state judge elaborated: “In the
past, news reports of court decisions said that ‘the Fifth Circuit’
decided X. Now it is far more likely that a news story will say
that ‘Judge A, appointed by President Bill Clinton (or by
President George W. Bush)’ decided X.” The effect is “to push
toward a cult of personality” and to reinforce the perception that
judges decide cases in accordance with political affiliation.
The “national information grid” also came up in this
context. Again the Massachusetts same-sex marriage case was
the exemplar. As one state judge said, the decision “had a ripple
effect on [his] state and others, not from anything that the judges
did in [his] state, but from concerns about what they might do.
Blogging and interest groups and a twenty-four-hour news cycle
all combine to produce a transferability of issues.”
Does increased media scrutiny have any impact on judicial
decisionmaking? None of the participants believed that media
attention changes the outcome of appellate decisions, but some
pointed to other possible effects. These include the contents of
opinions, the timing of decisions, and the determination about
which opinions get published. A state judge said that media
attention might “change the way that opinions are drafted,
especially in controversial cases.” In a similar vein, a federal
judge voiced the suspicion that that, in some of his court’s
opinions, “extra flourishes have been inserted in the hope of
attracting media attention.”
D. Self-Inflicted Wounds and the Role of Civility
Many of the factors that contribute to the politicization of
the judiciary are, obviously, beyond the control of the judges.
But that does not mean that the judges are blameless or that
there is nothing they can do to improve the situation. One
participant summed up a widely held perception when he
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commented that “some of the decline in public respect may be a
self inflicted wound. Judges bring controversy upon themselves
by the way they write their opinions.”
This observation was echoed, with a variety of emphases,
by many judges (as well as by lawyers and academics). Here are
some examples:
•

“There is a lot of chest-thumping about judicial
independence, but I think we bring some of [the
challenges] upon ourselves by the way we write,
particularly our dissents, where we accuse our
colleagues in the majority of being political in their
decisionmaking. And this provides the text for a lot
of the criticism for those on the outside. We need to
think about the consequences of the way we express
our views.” (A state judge.)

•

“There is a really bad public perception when you
see dissents and dissents [from] dissents and
concurring opinions—they look like the McLaughlin
group . . . and there’s a perception by the public, it’s
really horrendous.” (Another state judge.)

•

“Judges need to monitor their own words carefully
and tone down the harshness that has crept into so
many opinions. The public perception of the courts
is really harmed when, for example, a dissenting
Supreme Court justice criticizes the competence or
integrity of the majority.” (A federal judge.)

•

“There has been a change in tone, and we need to
think more about the fact that every opinion may be
amplified through the media.” (Another federal
judge.)

Participants also pointed to some of the circumstances that
may account for the increased harshness of judicial rhetoric:

HELLMANRESEND1.DOC

154

12/28/2006 12:08 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

•

“Law clerks can contribute to the lack of civility. If
they perceive that their judge is under attack, their
reaction is often to return fire.”

•

“One thing that may be contributing to the problem is
time pressures. The California appellate courts labor
under a 90-day rule; the judges don’t have time to
choose their words carefully and monitor each
other’s work closely.”

•

“I think it’s simply another symptom of the entire
coarsening of the culture [that began with] the events
of 1968. [In addition to] all the bad things that were
swept away in that ferment, we swept away some
good things, and [that includes] the sorts of internal
restraints that people used to carry around,
particularly people in positions of authority. . . . But
[that is not limited to] the legal system; the standards
are slipping everywhere.”

Judges also suggested that there are ways of avoiding selfinflicted wounds. Here are some of their comments:
•

“Sometimes it takes the intervention of a judge who
is not on a panel to get the judges who are writing the
majority and dissenting opinions to ratchet down
their rhetoric. “ (A federal judge.)

•

“Civility used to be a problem on [our court], until
the judges decided to police themselves carefully. If
a judge writes anything that is even the least bit
unkind, the other judges will pressure the judge to
change it.” (A state judge.)

•

“It’s fairly ordinary, when somebody sends out [a
draft opinion], and it’s too aggressive, for somebody
else on the court to either reply in writing or go to the
other person’s office and say, ‘I suggest you
reconsider how you said this. The legal point you
make is good, but [there’s a less aggressive way of
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writing it].’ And I’d have to say that in our little part
of the world, people usually react favorably to that.”
(A state judge.)
•

“[There is also] the issue of being respectful towards
the district courts. . . [Sometimes] I wince when I get
a draft from another chambers, where I feel that the
opinion of the district court has not been treated with
the respect that it deserves. But I’ve never had a
situation where I’ve said, ‘Don’t you think we might
say this in a different way?’ and the change hasn’t
been made.” (A federal judge.)

•

“We work very hard institutionally at collegiality
among ourselves, and I think we’ve kept the sniping
at each other in opinions to a minimum. When we
have a problem, we bring it up at a court meeting and
talk about it.” (A federal judge.)

•

“When an opinion strikes a statute down as
unconstitutional, it should be done with humility and
respect.” (A federal judge.)

The participants were not unanimous, however. One federal
judge said: “The idea that judges should craft their opinions to
make them more palatable to the public is a horrendous
suggestion. Where do you stop? It’s a slippery slope.” But the
dominant view was that judges can and should think about
public
perceptions—and
the
possibility
of
media
amplification—when they write their opinions.
E. Improving Public Understanding of the Courts
Underlying many of the specific points about tensions with
legislatures, the national information grid, and politicization of
the judiciary is a concern about public understanding of the
courts—or rather the lack of understanding. Some participants
commented specifically about this phenomenon and its causes.
For example:
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•

“The public raises legitimate questions about whether
judges are doing their jobs. Those questions arise
because anyone outside the process does not know
the answer to the questions. The courts need find
some way to communicate with the public that will
minimize the ability of cynical public opinion leaders
to foment misunderstanding.” (A state judge.)

•

“The public is buying the claim about judges being
activist. For the losing side, they want to attribute
loss to something other than the merits. So you need
to explain how you got to your decision.” (Another
state judge.)

•

“Everyone around the table would agree that the
public is woefully uninformed about how courts
operate. Why haven’t we done more to educate
journalists?” (A lawyer.)

The groups also considered various methods of remedying
the situation. Two generated extensive discussion: televising
oral arguments and finding better ways of explaining court
decisions.
1. Televising Oral Arguments
Justice Stephen Breyer, in response to a question at the
plenary session, discussed one frequently heard suggestion for
enhancing public understanding: televising appellate
proceedings. But Justice Breyer did not support the idea; on the
contrary, he emphasized the “things that [he was] frightened of”
if television cameras were allowed in the appellate courtroom.15
Some participants agreed, at least in part, with the
reservations voiced by Justice Breyer. A federal judge said that
he was worried about “grandstanding—i.e., lawyers making jury
arguments before appellate judges.” One lawyer reported that
several of his arguments had been televised; in one, his opposing
counsel used the opportunity to give a political speech and did
15. Stephen G. Breyer, Speech, The Future of Appellate Courts (2005 Natl. Conf. on
App. Just., D.C., Nov. 5, 2005) (copy on file with author).
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not answer the panel’s questions. A state judge said that the
press could cause distortions by broadcasting only selected
excerpts from arguments as news stories. And one of the
academic participants voiced the fear that, in states where judges
are elected, candidates might use films from oral arguments in
election advertisements. As a result, broadcasting arguments
might influence judicial decisionmaking. (Note, though, that a
state judge, in response, expressed disagreement on this point,
based on experience with televised arguments in that judge’s
state.)
These negative comments represented a distinctly minority
view at the Conference. As one Reporter summarized his
group’s discussion, “There was a very strong consensus in favor
of televising appellate court proceedings, and numerous
examples of favorable experience doing so.” In a similar vein,
another Reporter said: “Broadcasting appellate arguments
seemed to be generally acceptable to the group. There has been
experience with it in several jurisdictions of group members
without any major adverse consequences.”16
Several participants specifically supported televising oral
arguments in the United States Supreme Court. One lawyer said:
What goes on in the United States Supreme Court is
inspiring, and the American public should be able to see it.
Kelo is a great example of an oral argument that should
have been televised. There would have been much better
understanding of the outcome if people had seen that
17
argument.

Another lawyer added:
I’ve got a lot of lay friends who watched some of the John
Roberts confirmation, and aside from the uniform
comment, including my wife, on how handsome he is, a lot
of laypeople said he’s so bright that they felt better about
the Supreme Court knowing that somebody so bright would
be on the Supreme Court. And I think if they saw some of
the arguments there, they’d come away with the same
16. Many of the participants who supported televising oral arguments in appellate
courts emphasized that allowing cameras in trial courts—particularly in criminal proceedings—presents very different issues. That aspect of the discussion will not be further
treated in this Report, but it is important to note that the distinction was widely drawn.
17. The reference is to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the eminent
domain case.
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feeling—the Justices are serious people trying to do a
serious job.

Overall, what stands out is that with a handful of
exceptions, the participants who spoke on the basis of
experience said that the much-feared problems had not
materialized. In one state where supreme court arguments have
been webcast for five years, a judge said, “It doesn’t seem to
affect the behavior of Justices. And we haven’t heard from
lawyers about any adverse reactions.” A judge from another
state said that his court “provides a gavel-to-gavel feed of all
proceedings to public television. The reaction has generally
been very favorable.” Another state “has had a good experience
with cameras in the Supreme Court.”
Some judges, on the basis of their experience, explicitly
took issue with Justice Breyer. Said one:
We’ve had tremendous, tremendous, success in [our state]
with absolute transparency. Every appellate argument in
every court is streamed live over the internet, Supreme
Court arguments are live on television, and everything is
archived. If there’s a question about [what was said], all
you’ve got to do is click the button, go back and look at it. I
was disappointed because Justice Breyer immediately went
to the question of criminal trials. Well, that’s not what the
question was.

Another judge emphasized the benefits of making
videorecorded oral arguments widely available:
When you do streaming video or reruns on the community
access channel, what you get is a relatively small but very
high quality of audience of lawyers, school children,
college classes, and journalists from the local press, who
wouldn’t have covered this case because they wouldn’t
come to the state capitol to do it. . . . I’ve come to look at
this very differently because we get so much feedback from
opinion leaders who watch that stuff. Legislators watch it,
political people watch it, and that’s a place where we need
all the help we can get. . . . If you create your own point of
access, whether written or video, you do get a pretty good
bang for a very little buck.

The participants who spoke on the basis of experience
generally remained supportive even as they acknowledged
occasional problems. For example, one judge observed that the
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media “choose the most salacious cases,” and that the filming
does not always serve an educational purpose. But the judge also
emphasized that “filming is done very responsibly because the
media does not want the filming rights revoked. After
approximately thirty seconds, one forgets that the cameras are
rolling.” Another judge said that televising court hearings did
affect how some judges behaved: “One judge was afraid to ask
questions, and another was a camera hog. And some of the
advocates appeared more nervous.” But, overall, the court’s
experience was described as “good.” And a judge from another
state added: “Once it becomes routine, those problems
disappear. The camera can be concealed, and soon everyone
forgets it’s there.”
2. Explaining Court Decisions
The traditional view is that courts speak only through their
opinions. Moreover, those opinions generally are written for
readers trained in the law—primarily lawyers and other judges.
The task of translating legal prose into everyday language has
been left to outsiders, particularly the media. This raises the
question: In an era in which many court decisions are of great
interest to a broader public, should the courts themselves take
steps to explain their rulings in a more accessible way? There
was extensive discussion of this point in the breakout sessions,
but no consensus.
Some participants argued that courts should hire public
information officers or issue press releases. One state judge
elaborated on this view by comparing the handling of the Bush
v. Gore litigation in the Florida Supreme Court and in the United
States Supreme Court:
Florida had this very able fellow who held regular press
conferences. He gave the press information, something to
cover, not in secret, but straightforward explanations of
what was happening in the Florida Supreme Court today
and how it related to other cases that were then pending in
other courts in Florida. Then he came out with the Courtissued opinions. I know that many judges say, “just read the
opinion.” Well, nonsense. It’s not a bad thing for somebody
to be able to point to this or that page and say “what the
court said about this is such and such.”
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Contrast that with that incredible scene on the steps of the
Supreme Court when they handed down the decision. They
did it late at night when everybody was tired. I was
watching C-SPAN or CNN or somebody. They had two
reporters: “You read the first half, and I’ll read the second.”
It was obliviousness that really passes all understanding.
At a crucial moment it seemed to me that the level of public
understanding and acceptance of those decisions had a lot
to do with—not the only thing, but it had a fair amount to
do with—the ham-fisted way the Supreme Court handled it,
and how the Florida court did just the opposite.

Other state judges described how their courts have taken
steps to help the public understand their decisions. Said one:
Our court has a public information officer who is a former
reporter herself and who has worked well with the media.
Reporters are now assigned to the court, and they develop
expertise in covering the court’s work. The reporters really
try to get it right, and they are getting it right more and
more. The public seems to be understanding more about
what judges do.

Another court has gone even further:
Our court [now issues] press releases for our highest profile
cases. They are written with the author of the opinion, a
member of the court, and they’re approved by the whole
court before they go out. [The reason we do this is that] the
opinion is sometimes too complicated and doesn’t really
say [what the court has decided]. And so this is the
shorthand way of saying here’s what the court thinks the
issues are. [These press releases] are greatly appreciated by
the press and the public, and sometimes get into stories
almost verbatim because they cut to the chase.

A federal judge said that his court had obtained some funds
to hire a public information officer, and it worked well. “The
person we had was very helpful, but then with budgetary
cutbacks, we didn’t have the funds.” However, this judge did not
specify what the public information officer’s responsibilities
were, and there is reason to doubt that these included issuing
press releases explaining court decisions.
Other judges were more skeptical about hiring public
information officers to explain appellate decisions to the media.
A federal judge said that press releases inevitably interpret
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opinions and thereby provide a “spin” on the cases. A state
judge said that it might be useful for courts to post unofficial
synopses of cases on the Internet and that his court was
considering moving in that direction. He acknowledged,
however, that limiting a case summary to a few sentences could
pose a risk of distorting the thrust of the opinion. One Reporter
summarized what appears to be a widely held view: There are
advantages to providing information, but there are also risks in
“trying to capture difficult issues in a few words.”
Several participants suggested that courts could
communicate better without issuing press releases if judges
wrote opinions with more of an eye to a general audience. One
participant said courts should “take great care, particularly in
politically controversial cases, to write their opinions in ways
that will help the public understand why the law required the
disposition the court reached.” A federal judge made the point
even more emphatically: “There are some cases where you can
write the opinion [in such a way] that the justification [is] put in
terms comprehensible to anyone who goes to the trouble of
finding the opinion. The idea in writing the opinion in that way
is that it helps to sell the court’s result to the public.”
3. Other Measures
Participants also offered other suggestions for improving
public understanding of the courts. Some focused on the media,
because, as one judge said, “that is where the public gets most of
their education about courts.” A recurring theme is that courts
should “educate journalists, so that they can carry the message.”
One judge described a “sort of one-day law school for
journalists.” The court worked with a local university and
brought in television reporters as well as print journalists. The
judge elaborated on the benefits of the program:
In talking about the basic issues, we each learn a lot about
each other. And one of the things we learned [is that] the
media, because of budget cuts and otherwise, don’t have as
many regular people that cover the courts [as they used to,
so] they have to do that in addition to other assignments.
And they don’t get special training about the courts, and I
think [we ought to do] more of that exchange of ideas.
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But outreach need not be limited to journalists. There was
wide agreement, as summarized by one Reporter, that “public
education projects, as well as bench/bar committees, are
worthwhile in counteracting ignorance or misunderstandings
about judges and the judicial process.” In another group, a state
judge described a program that “took the Supreme Court on the
road.” The judge explained:
We go into communities and into local court houses. Lawyers and teachers teach students in advance on the cases.
The students hear the cases and [they have a chance to talk
with] the lawyers that just argued the cases. The cases are
on a fast track to be decided, so they’re decided before the
school year is over, and the kids then get to talk about the
case after it’s decided.

III. PRECEDENT, UNIFORMITY, AND APPELLATE STRUCTURE
The 1975 conference took place at a time of ferment over
issues involving precedent and appellate structure. The
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(Hruska Commission) was engaged in a wide-ranging study to
determine whether the existing structure provided “adequate
capacity for the declaration of national law.”18 The American
Bar Association had begun work on standards relating to
appellate courts, including various approaches to maintaining
decisional consistency in state judicial systems.19 Institutional
endeavors such as these provided a focus for discussion that was
lacking at the 2005 Conference. Rather, the participants talked
about uniformity, predictability, and the non-structural
arrangements that might promote or retard those goals.
A. National Uniformity and the Role of the Supreme Court
Simultaneously with the planning of the 1975 Conference,
the Hruska Commission was carrying out its investigation of
“national appellate capacity.” A few months after the

18. Hruska Commission Report, supra n. 9, at 217.
19. See ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating
to Appellate Courts § 3.01 (ABA 1977).
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Conference, the Commission issued its final report. The
Commission recommended creation of a National Court of
Appeals to decide questions of national law that were important
enough to require national resolution, but not necessarily
important enough to demand the time of the Supreme Court.20
The debate over national appellate capacity continued for
roughly the next two decades, particularly in the early 1980s,
when Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to create an
“Intercircuit Tribunal” similar in purpose to the National Court
of Appeals.21 By 1998, however, the issue had disappeared
almost entirely from the realm of legal discourse.22 Not
surprisingly, at the 2005 Conference, there was almost no
discussion of the topic, and there was no support at all for
creating new structures of the kind proposed by the Hruska
Commission and Chief Justice Burger.
One group did address the “national law” issue. The
Reporter summarized the discussion:
On the question of conflicts, the group generally agreed
that long-lasting conflicts do create problems for district
courts and practitioners. Those conflicts may come from
intra-circuit decisions, splits between circuits, or from splits
between state courts interpreting federal law and federal
district and circuit courts interpreting the same federal law.
The degree to which a conflict creates a serious problem
depends in part upon the degree to which the issue
necessarily crosses jurisdictional boundaries. Some issues
are clearly national in scope, such as interpretation of class
action certification requirements; others are not.

One participant elaborated on this last point:
I agree that this is a problem in types of cases that are
national practice cases. For example, in class action
20. Disclosure note: I served as Deputy Director of the Hruska Commission and helped
to write its report.
21. See e.g. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 ABA J.
442 (Apr. 1983).
22. The final blow was administered by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals, whose Final Report, issued in late 1998, did not even mention the subject. This was particularly telling because the Chairman of the Commission was
retired Justice Byron White, who had been a strong supporter of the various national court
proposals. See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, Final Report (Dec. 18, 1998), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/
final/appstruc.pdf.
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practice, we stumbled along with a four-to-four circuit split
on aggregation for jurisdictional purposes, and it got
resolved [by the Supreme Court] only this last year, just
when the issue became less relevant because of legislation.
There remain significant splits on certification issue, and
the choice of which circuit to send cases to from the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel can be outcome
determinative. This makes forum selection and shopping
23
decisive.

Yet even in that group, the participants were in general
agreement that “there aren’t that many conflicts, and there is a
valid reason for letting conflicts persist while the law
‘percolates’ before taking the issue to the Supreme Court.” In
other groups, although there were scattered references to
conflicts that go unresolved, the “national law” issue received
even less attention.
Related issues generated some discussion. For example, a
few participants expressed dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court’s reliance on the cert pool in selecting cases for plenary
consideration. Said one:
My biggest frustration is with the process used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in deciding whether to grant cert. The cert
pool in which eight of the nine justices participate
essentially delegates that decision to a single 25-year-old
law clerk. Clients have a hard time understanding how
their lives and fortunes can be placed in the hands of a
single 25-year-old.

A participant in another group echoed this concern and
suggested that reliance on the cert pool has had deleterious
effects on the kinds of cases selected for plenary review:
Clients seeking certiorari in the Supreme Court are
dismayed to learn that, except in exceptional
circumstances, the Justices decide which cases to take—or
not take—based only on a “pool memo” from a recent law
school graduate. . . . When these graduates, the product of
a legal education that gives disproportionate emphasis to
constitutional law, play such an important role in
determining the cases that the Court accepts for review,
23. The speaker was referring to the Supreme Court decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), and to the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 12 (2005).
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perhaps it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Court’s
docket is heavy on constitutional law and light on
commercial law cases. In my view, the Court is making
itself irrelevant, in part by taking so few cases every year
and in part by the esoteric nature of much of the Court’s
docket. There are lots of important issues, in the area of
commercial law and other disfavored fields, that the Court
is choosing to ignore.

But most lawyers did not share this frustration, and no
judge discussed the point.
A somewhat larger number of participants expressed
dismay at the product of some of the cases the Court does take.
In one group, several conferees said that the Supreme Court
sometimes issues confusing opinions that actually create
conflicts in the lower courts. In another, the discussion led to a
gentle ribbing of Justice Stephen Breyer, who had spoken at the
plenary session. A judge cited the example of the Establishment
Clause, which has generated a very large body of decisions over
the past several decades. The judge asked rhetorically: “Do we
know anything more about the Establishment Clause now than
we knew in 1962 or ‘63?” A lawyer responded, “I had a nonlawyer friend who told me a couple of days ago, if I had the
chance, ask Justice Breyer about his two decisions on the Ten
Commandments.”24 Laughter obscured the other responses.
B. Uniformity and Predictability within Circuits
In contrast to the lack of interest in the problem of
“national appellate capacity,” most of the breakout groups
engaged in extensive discussion of issues relating to uniformity
of decisions within individual circuits. As several participants
noted, all circuits follow the rule that decisions of three-judge
panels are binding on subsequent panels unless overruled by the

24. In June 2005, a few months before the Conference, the Supreme Court handed
down two decisions involving Establishment Clause challenges to displays of the Ten
Commandments. The Court held that one of the displays was constitutional and that the
other was not. Only Justice Breyer voted in the majority in both cases. For edited versions
of the two decisions and commentary (including Justice Breyer’s own explanation), see
Arthur D. Hellman, William D. Araiza & Thomas E. Baker, First Amendment Law: Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion 974-98 (LexisNexis 2006).
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Supreme Court or by the court of appeals en banc. But this rule
does not necessarily preclude the development of conflicts.
First, a later panel may purport to adhere to the law of the
circuit, but other members of the court may view the decision as
creating an inconsistency. As one judge said, “The problem that
we most often experience is conflicting precedents. Like most
circuits, we do not allow one panel to overrule a precedent set
by another. So we often have panels straining to distinguish
their cases from prior circuit decisions.”
Second, conflicts may develop because the lawyers have
failed to provide the kind of help that the court needs. As one
circuit judge said, “At times, lawyers do not bring to the court’s
attention binding precedent, and thus problems can be created.”
Advocacy can also fall short in more subtle ways. A lawyer
commented:
Part of the reason why there is growth of the appellate
specialist is that so often the lawyer who tried the case is
still so angry about that evidentiary point or seventeen
other [rulings by the trial court]. Hopefully the appellate
specialist is able to push it down to that point of law that’s
really likely to do something. But you don’t have to be an
appellate specialist to be the one to call to the court’s
attention to the fact that there are discrepancies in the case
law. [My point is that] the lawyers can play a role through
careful analysis and presentation of those intracircuit or
intrastate conflicts, and then you get it worked out.
And I also think that lawyers can help [in other ways].
Generally there are not ten issues in a case; there are the
one or two real issues on which the case is going to turn. A
brief that hones down to what the case really is about is
probably going to do a great deal to help the court [do its
job]. When I was a law clerk, [there were some briefs that]
you just looked at and said, “How do I even start in helping
the judge analyze this?”

Third, problems can arise when the same issue is presented
to two or more panels at the same time. Several groups
discussed the various approaches to this situation. A colloquy in
one group captured the thrust of the debate:
Judge 1: “In my circuit, the opinion that is considered
binding is the opinion issued in the case that was argued
first, even if it is not the opinion that is published first.”
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Lawyer 1: “That is not the way the rule works in other
circuits. It is the first opinion that is published that is
considered binding. But under that system, there sometimes
is a rush to be the first to publish.”
Judge 2: “That definitely happens in my circuit.”
Lawyer 2: “Has your circuit considered adopting the firstargued rule?”
Judge 2: “No. One problem with that approach is that it
sometimes takes a panel forever to get an opinion out. The
other panels don’t want to hold up their opinions while they
wait for the first panel to publish.”

Other circuits take preemptive action to avoid having the
same issue pending before two different panels. As a participant
from one such circuit explained, when two or more cases raising
the same issue are filed at roughly the same time, the clerk’s
office tries to assign all of the cases to the same panel. If a later
appeal is filed raising an issue that is already pending before
another panel, the clerk’s office will often hold the second
appeal until the first appeal is decided and then ask for
supplemental briefing.
The participants also discussed practices that allow a panel
to repudiate circuit precedent without the need of rehearing en
banc. In the Seventh Circuit, a panel may frontally overrule a
prior decision if it circulates a draft opinion to all active judges
and “a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue
of whether the [new] position should be adopted.”25 The Second
Circuit has a similar procedure, but its availability is
considerably more limited. As one participant described it,
The panel will write an opinion narrowing or rejecting the
prior precedent and will circulate the opinion to the full
court. If no judge objects, the opinion will issue with a
footnote saying that the panel’s decision to reject the
precedent has been circulated to the entire court and no
judge has objected. In this way, the en banc court de facto
modifies a prior precedent without the need for an en banc
argument.

Thus, in the Second Circuit, panel overruling requires
unanimous consent of the active judges—a sharp contrast to the
25. 7th Cir. R. 40(e).
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Seventh Circuit practice, which allows overruling unless a
majority of the judges object. Further, the Second Circuit
procedure is generally not used to “frontally overrule” a
precedent, but rather when the precedent has already been
weakened by being “distinguished to death.”
In the Fourth Circuit, if a panel wishes to depart from a
prior decision, the panel will circulate a letter to the full court
requesting an initial hearing en banc. But it appears that if a
majority of the active judges do not vote for the en banc hearing,
the panel must adhere to the precedent notwithstanding its
disagreement. In some other circuits, published opinions are
circulated to the full court before filing “so that potential en
banc cases can be identified even before an en banc petition is
received.” However, this procedure does not free panels from
the obligation to adhere to the law established by prior
decisions.
Overall, participants in the Conference—lawyers as well as
judges—seemed to agree that court of appeals panels generally
follow circuit precedent.26 At the same time, they recognized
that there are “conflicts in terms of how the law is applied to the
facts.” But this phenomenon was not viewed as reflecting any
kind of systemic defect. One Reporter’s summary is illustrative:
The group agreed that appellate judges rarely will
deliberately refuse to follow binding precedent. Instead,
conflicts generally arise in how judges apply the law to
particular facts. Everyone agreed that in the application of
law to fact, the outcome in a case could well depend on
which judges are assigned to the panel. But the group,
while clearly troubled by such conflicts, did not think that
anything realistically could be done. No one favored the
use of frequent en bancs to apply the law to specific facts.
All agreed that such conflicts were an inherent part of our
judicial system.

As this quotation suggests, the participants used the term
“conflict” in a rather broad sense, encompassing unpredictability
as well as inconsistency. Unpredictability came up in some other
26. One lawyer said that this is not true of the Ninth Circuit: “In the Ninth Circuit, an
attorney can find a precedent for just about any proposition. It is very easy to find flatly
conflicting precedents without any acknowledgment of the conflict by the panels or the en
banc court. This is terribly frustrating for attorneys and their clients.” No other participant
voiced this criticism of the Ninth or any other circuit.
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contexts as well. In particular, a few participants expressed
concern that extensive use of visiting judges on court of appeals
panels “reduces predictability.”
C. Uniformity and Predictability in State Systems
Not surprisingly, it is more difficult to generalize about
state appellate courts than about the federal circuits, but here too
there was little evidence of serious malfunction in the system of
precedent.
In most states, the appellate structure resembles that of the
federal system: “the intermediate courts . . . handle the great
mass of appeals,” while the supreme court is “reserved for
decision of the more important cases, usually those of
significance to the law and the administration of justice and not
solely of interest to the litigants.”27 But based on the breakout
session reports, it appears that the actual relationship between
the state supreme court and the intermediate court is often quite
different from what we see in the federal system. There is a
greater sense of participation in a shared enterprise, and little if
any of the Olympian aloofness that has characterized the United
States Supreme Court in recent years.28 Here are some
examples:
•

“The judges in [my state’s] intermediate appellate
courts work very hard to avoid conflicts and will
sometimes order en banc sua sponte while a panel
case is pending. If conflicts persist from one
intermediate court to another, the [state] Supreme
Court is good about resolving such conflicts.” (A
lawyer.)

•

“Our state intermediate appellate courts face conflicts
from time to time. There are [several] divisions, and
one is not bound by another. But this is usually not a
problem because (1) judges bend over backwards not

27. Daniel John Meador, American Courts 14 (West Pub. Co. 1991).
28. See Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supra n. 11, at 432-38; Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits
of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging versus Error Correction in the Supreme
Court, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271 (2006).
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to create conflicts, and (2) conflicts that do arise are
resolved fairly rapidly by the [state] Supreme Court.”
(A judge.)
•

“In my state, one court of appeals cannot overrule
another. The courts of appeals decide 1600 to 1700
cases a year. Given the volume, sometimes a
precedent is overlooked; in those instances the state
Supreme Court lets the intermediate appeals court
know about it.” (A judge.)

Some participants explicitly noted differences between the
federal system and state systems that might lead to more
frequent intervention by the state high court. One participant
said:
We should not assume that the federal approach is
necessarily appropriate for the states. In the federal system,
only the Supreme Court can fix conflicts among the
circuits, and getting Supreme Court review is very difficult.
In the states, though, the supreme courts have greater
capacity. Perhaps the states should permit panels of
intermediate appellate courts to disagree. That would spur
the state supreme courts to address issues that they should
address but might otherwise duck.

Another participant commented that “state supreme courts will
grant review for conflicts involving different formulations of a
legal principle, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court is much less
likely to do so in that circumstance.”
Participants also discussed techniques that allow judges on
an intermediate court to “send a signal” to the supreme court
that they “are not entirely content with [some] existing
precedent.” In one state, dissenting opinions serve that purpose;
there is an appeal as of right to the supreme court if there is a
dissenting opinion in the intermediate court. Another state uses
the “special concurrence”:
In essence the special concurrence states that the court did
X because existing precedent required it to do so, but the
court is not comfortable with that result and requests review
by the Supreme Court. Such special concurrences are
sometimes written even when the panel is unanimous
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(because of precedent), and all members of the panel may
join in the concurrence.

Other participants offered more mixed assessments of the
operation of precedent and the governing institutional
arrangements in particular states.
•

A judge: “Our court has a rule that says that one
panel cannot issue an opinion that conflicts with
another panel. One effect of this is that it leads some
judges to spend a lot of time trying to distinguish
existing precedent. Of course, sometimes it can’t be
done, and the cases have to be taken en banc.”

•

A lawyer: “In [the largest city in my state] there are
twenty-four appeals court judges. Lawyers in [that
city] tell their clients that it is impossible to predict
the likelihood of success on appeal until the panel is
selected. [But this is not a matter of ideology.]
Unlike the situations described in [two federal courts
of appeals], all of the appellate court judges are
[members of the same political party]. In contrast, it
is possible to give a clearer idea of what the [state]
supreme court will do.”

•

A state supreme court justice: “In my state, panels of
the intermediate courts are not required to follow
each other’s precedents. When a conflict develops,
the supreme court will take the case.” An
intermediate court judge from the same state (but a
different small group): “It is a problem when
intermediate courts in the state have conflicts that are
not resolved by our supreme court.”

But the overall impression that emerges from the breakout
session reports is that the system of precedent works pretty
much as it should. The point is illustrated by these comments:
•

A lawyer: “I’ve found that occasionally, within a
jurisdiction, you’ll find inconsistency, but generally
it gets resolved fairly quickly once it’s pointed out,
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so I’m not sure it’s as big of an issue as some make it
out to be. Seems like, if you tell the [state] Supreme
Court, ‘Hey, you’ve got two cases, and they seem to
say opposite things,’ in the third case, they tend to
deal with it; so I think it’s just kind of a function of a
growing number of judges and cases that you’re
going to get those inconsistencies, and I don’t see a
problem getting them worked out.”
•

An intermediate court judge: “Our court has a
process in place to avoid creating conflicting
precedents; that is the primary use to which we put
our central legal staff. I don’t think that they catch
every potential conflict, but the existence of
conflicting precedents is not cited frequently as a
basis for granting reargument.”

•

A Reporter (summarizing several comments within
the group): “It is not common for conflicts among
panels of intermediate state courts to remain unfixed.
Either a state will follow the horizontal-precedent
rule and conflicts will not develop, or the state will
not follow the horizontal-precedent rule and the
supreme court will fix the conflicts that arise.”
D. The Non-Precedential Precedent

Based on what I have reported thus far, it would seem that
the system of precedent operates fairly smoothly in both state
and federal courts notwithstanding the volume of appeals. But
we have not yet reckoned with the phenomenon of the nonprecedential precedent—in common parlance, the unpublished
appellate opinion.29

29. The term “non-precedential precedent” was first used by Judge Robert Sprecher of
the Seventh Circuit at a hearing of the Hruska Commission in 1974. See William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1167,
1167 (1978).
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“Unpublished” is of course a misnomer.30 In all circuits and
in many states, “unpublished” opinions are readily available on
court websites and on Lexis and Westlaw. Sometimes (as in the
federal system) they are published in bound printed volumes.
Thus, the problem is not that unpublished opinions are literally
unpublished or inaccessible. Rather, as participants pointed out,
unpublished opinions implicate concerns about uniformity and
predictability in three interrelated ways.31
First, unpublished opinions are not treated as binding
precedent. Even if an unpublished opinion appears to present the
identical issue in an identical factual setting, a later panel is not
obliged to follow it.
Second, in many appellate courts, published opinions are
circulated in draft form to all members of the court before they
are released to the public. Unpublished opinions are not. Thus,
off-panel judges do not have an opportunity to review the
opinion and identify possible conflicts with existing precedent.
Third and most critically, when an opinion is designated as
“not for publication,” the panel is permitted—and indeed often
encouraged—to provide only a skeletal statement of the facts
(perhaps not even that) and a conclusory statement of the
rationale.32 One consequence of this format is that, as a state
judge observed, there is very little that litigants can cite in future
disputes. What is more important, neither litigants nor anyone
else can determine, simply from reading the opinion, whether
the panel has failed to follow a precedent on point or has
otherwise created a conflict.
In this light, it is not surprising that several lawyers in the
breakout sessions voiced the concern that unpublished opinions
are used as a device to avoid controlling precedents. Said one:
“One hears about it anecdotally that panels wanted to avoid the
law of circuit, so they decided not to publish.” Said another:
30. See Stephen L. Wasby, Publication (Or Not) of Appellate Rulings: An Evaluation
of Guidelines, 2 Seton Hall Cir. L. Rev. 41, 42-43 & n. 4 (2005).
31. In planning the 2005 Conference, the Steering Committee made a considered decision to de-emphasize the subject of unpublished opinions. This Report deals with the topic
only in the present context.
32. The Ninth Circuit offers this model for treating an issue in an unpublished opinion:
“Defendant’s statements were volunteered rather than made in response to police questioning, and were therefore admissible. U.S. v. Cornejo, 598 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1979).
AFFIRMED.” 9th Cir. General Orders 4.3.a (“Memoranda Dispositions”) (2005).
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From my perspective, there are lots of cases where what
appears to be happening is that the court is avoiding a
certain result by issuing an unpublished opinion. [The
proliferation of] unpublished opinions creates the
perception that it’s worth taking a chance on an appeal
because you might be the one who gets an unpublished
disposition going your way.

The judges in the groups generally took the position that
unpublished opinions are not used in cases that do not warrant
them. As one judge said of his own court, “The judges play it
straight.” But comments by other judges lend some support to
the lawyers’ concerns. One state judge described unpublished
opinions as “the elephant’s burial ground for bad cases.”
Another state judge said:
It used to be that “hard cases make bad law.” Now “hard
cases make unpublished opinions.” There is a temptation to
duck difficult issues by addressing them in unpublished
opinions, and [my court] sometimes succumbs to that
temptation.

One federal judge said that if a panel on his court disagreed
with a prior published opinion, it might use “an unpublished,
non-citable opinion in order to achieve a just result without
running afoul of the first-panel rule.” But no other judge, state or
federal, made a comment along those lines.
If unpublished opinions are being widely used—as this
judge suggests—”to achieve a just result without running afoul
of the first-panel rule,” this would obviously be a cause for
concern. What is at stake is not so much the fabric of precedent
as the basic responsibility of courts to treat like cases alike.
Based on the breakout session reports, it is impossible to reach a
conclusion on this point; the material is simply too sketchy. But
it is worth emphasizing that even the lawyers who expressed
greatest concern about the misuse of unpublished opinions
recognized that a supposedly controlling precedent “may not in
actuality be all that controlling.” That is, there may be
superficial similarities to a published opinion, but there are also
differences. Those differences mean that the panel probably has
not failed in its obligation to treat like cases alike.
The more complex question is whether appellate courts, in
withholding so many decisions from the corpus of binding
precedent, are being faithful to what one participant called “the
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way of the common law.” On this point the debates at the
breakout sessions mirrored those that have taken place in many
other forums. The following exchange from one group (only
slightly edited) gives a sense of the competing views:
Judge A: “What is the conceivable value of the one
thousandth precedent on the standard of review for a
summary judgment?”
Lawyer B: “If the law is being applied to a unique set of
facts, it could have value.”
Lawyer C: “Why not let the lawyers decide if it has value?”
Judge D: “The bar would be much better off doing
traditional legal research using published precedent.”
Judge E: “At common law, every decided case was
available. Courts did not distinguish between correcting
error and establishing precedent.”
Judge F: “The problem today is the availability of computer
research. Briefs that string-cite seven cases for every point
are not useful to the court. Lawyers should reason by
analogy, not example. More examples are not useful.”
Lawyer G: “That doesn’t give much credit to appellate
lawyers. I’m not going to win my cases by citing a lot of
sludge. I’m going to cull out the most persuasive
authority.”

Another group took the discussion one step further, as the
Reporter’s summary indicates:
The group recognized that the way of the common law is to
perform both functions—correcting error and declaring the
law. Indeed, the fine factual distinctions that lead to
unpublished opinions are the heart of the common law. And
from the standpoint of the practicing bar, opinions that
draw fine factual distinctions are the very opinions that
lawyers need to give better guidance to clients.

But the account cannot end there. Several judges made the
point that they “could not possibly vet all of the decisions” that
their colleagues hand down. A federal judge commented:
“Publication is a signal that we’ll stand behind every word of the
opinion; it’s just too hard to keep up with [everything that every
judge writes for the court].” A state judge agreed: “As a lawyer I
would have thought that everything should be published. My
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perspective changed as an intermediate appellate judge. In that
position you don’t have the time to think through the precise
language that you use in every decision.” The federal judge
added: “Or to worry about the language that your colleagues
use.” And if that is the reality, is it accurate to say that a lawyer
could “give better guidance to clients” based on the “fine factual
distinctions” drawn in an opinion designated as “not for
publication”?
The arguments about unpublished opinions can easily call
to mind the labyrinthine drawings of M.C. Escher: Just when
you think you are looking at a different level of the structure,
you realize that you’re actually back where you started. It is not
surprising that the participants in the 2005 Conference did not
solve the puzzle.
E. The Significance of Conflict and the Role of Precedent
At a conference on appellate courts, it is only natural to
look closely at the role of precedent. And in view of the history
recounted at the start of this Report, it was to be expected that
the planners for the 2005 Conference would focus particularly
on issues of uniformity and predictability in appellate decisions.
Yet as I review the breakout session reports, what stands out is
skepticism about the salience of conflict and even about the
importance of precedent. This is evident in some of the
comments I have already quoted, but the point emerged quite
directly in an exchange in one of the groups:
A trial judge: “I really resonated with what [one of the
plenary speakers] said about the different degrees of
precedent and the different kinds of issues. If there’s a
discrete issue on which there’s [controlling precedent], then
it’s easy: you follow it, like it or not, and then you go on to
the next case and the next issue. But I’ve found both as a
lawyer and as a trial judge that there are many issues on
which the precedents aren’t totally controlling. They give
you values, preferred values, or [they point you to] the
weight of certain factors [or] multi-factored tests which are
not controlling in the sense that they end your analysis. [In
that situation], the lawyers as advocates ought to be able to
argue from the force that the opinions give to how they
apply in the particular circumstances of this case. And I as
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a judge have the obligation and the privilege of explaining
why I think those values apply in [one way and not
another]. And [if that means a degree of uncertainty], I’m
OK with that.”
A lawyer: “I agree with that totally. I think this idea that
that we need all these precedents for dictating a particular
result [is just not correct]. I think there’s far more of danger
that you get a lot of cases that end up saying something on
the way to a result that ends up inappropriately binding
lower courts down the road.”
Another lawyer: “On the idea of precedent, [another of the
plenary speakers] has a good way of describing it. He says,
‘We’re still calling it law school; it ought to be “fact
school,”‘ because so much of the law is driven by the facts.
I agree with that. It’s rare that I have conflicting precedents
that I can’t get around by saying, ‘Your facts and my case
might be different.’”
A state appellate judge: “You’ve really said what I had not
said as an appellate judge, which is that I think we ought to
be careful about breathing life into this illusion that on
every given statement of facts there is a controlling law.
But we don’t have Hammurabi’s Code, thank goodness; we
don’t have that kind of system of law and, you know, those
of us who believe in the common law tradition ought not
forget the value of that. The citizenry tends to think–maybe
from watching Judge Judy or reading newspapers–that on
every given dispute, there is a controlling point of law;
well, it’s an absurd illusion, because why would you have
courts and lawyers, if that were the case?”

Comments like these help to explain why the various
proposals for a National Court of Appeals or an Intercircuit
Tribunal never gained any real traction among judges and
lawyers. The point is not that precedent is unimportant. The
point, rather, is that in the cases that claim the time of judges
and lawyers, precedent does not “end [the] analysis;” it simply
provides a starting-point. Enlarging the corpus of authoritative
precedents may move the starting-point in one direction or the
other, but it does not substantially alter the process that judges
and lawyers must engage in.

HELLMANRESEND1.DOC

178

12/28/2006 12:08 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

IV. VOLUME, PROCESS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION
As already noted, a central theme of the 1975 Conference
was the effect of the “staggering inflation in caseload” on the
appellate process. The Conference briefing book painted a bleak
picture: “[N]one of the options for dealing with increased
caseload is likely to be attractive. . . . An important point of
beginning . . . is that there is no wholly benign solution. The
price can be paid in one or more of several currencies, but pay
we must.”33 And the threat was not simply to the quality of the
process. Professor Paul D. Carrington, in his report on those
breakout sessions, described the far-reaching consequences that
the participants feared: “For a judge to serve only as an agent of
quality control and to provide a visible front for an otherwise
faceless apparatus involves not only a departure from tradition,
but also a real sacrifice in the human sensitivity of the
government.”34
In 1985, ten years after that first Conference, Judge Richard
Posner published a book with the title The Federal Courts:
Crisis and Reform. In it, he noted the particular difficulty of
dealing with increases in caseloads at the appellate level: You
cannot simply add judges without generating adverse
consequences somewhere in the appellate hierarchy. Judge
Posner acknowledged that judges and commentators had been
complaining about caseloads for twenty-five years, but, he said,
this time “the wolf really does seem to be at the door.”35
Fast-forward now to 2005, or rather 2004, when the
Steering Committee started planning the 2005 Conference.
There was no widely shared sense of crisis such as the one that
existed in 1975 and for some years thereafter. No one was
saying that “there is no wholly benign solution” to the problems
of appellate courts or that “pay we must” for the consequences
of volume.

33. Appellate Justice 1975, supra n. 6, at vol. I (Summary and Background) 3 (emphasis in original).
34. Paul D. Carrington, Report on Group Discussions, in Appellate Justice 1975, supra
n. 6, at vol. V (Supplement, Proceedings, and Conclusions) 65.
35. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 317 (Harvard U. Press
1985).
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The absence of a sense of crisis was one of the things the
Steering Committee focused on in planning the 2005
Conference. After all, caseloads did not decline. In most courts,
particularly in the federal system, they continued to increase.
Few appellate courts added any significant number of new
judges. So if the wolf was really tearing the door down in 1975
or 1985, by 2005 the door should have been no more than a pile
of splinters, and the wolf should have been sitting in the center
seat, the master of the courthouse.
But almost no one thinks that that is the reality today. So
one of the things we hoped to accomplish with the 2005
Conference was to find an answer to the question: What did
happen between 1975 and 2005?
There are many possible explanations, and they are not
mutually exclusive, but for purposes of this Report I will
concentrate on two points at opposite ends of the spectrum.
One possibility is that there never really was a crisis. There
was change, and there was growth, but there was also
adaptation. People overreacted at the time because the
phenomenon of rapid growth was new, and its consequences
could not be foreseen. Moreover, some courts responded to
increased caseloads with innovative techniques and practices.
Most lawyers respect tradition, and many mistrust change. It
would not be surprising if people overreacted, not only to the
increased volume, but also to the measures taken to cope with
that volume.
If that is the explanation, we do not have to worry. But
there is another possibility: That the quality of appellate justice
has deteriorated, but the participants in the system have not
noticed any falling-off. They have not noticed it because it has
happened so gradually, and also because the measures that were
initially adopted as stopgaps—as triage, to use a familiar
metaphor—have become accepted as the norm. In other words,
we’ve lost something valuable that we used to have, but we
don’t miss it (or most of us don’t) because we don’t realize that
we’ve lost it.
To determine which of these explanations is closer to the
truth, the Conference proceeded in two steps. First, we invited
some outstanding plenary speakers to present facts and figures
as well as their hypotheses. Second, we used the breakout
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sessions to get the individual and collective perceptions of
participants in the system: the judges and the lawyers.
The lead plenary speaker was none other than Judge
Posner. But between 1985 and 2005 his own perception had
changed substantially. The second edition of his book, published
in 1996, was not subtitled “Crisis and Reform”; its subtitle was
“Challenge and Reform.”36
What Judge Posner said at the 2005 Conference was that,
contrary to dire predictions in the 1970s (and, he might have
added, his own comments in 1985), the increased caseload per
judge has been accommodated with relatively little difficulty by
a number of changes that enhance judicial productivity. He
listed several of these changes:
•

curtailment in the frequency and length of oral
argument;

•

more law clerks;

•

greater use of staff attorneys;

•

better screening of judicial candidates; and

•

advances in information technology.

Judge Posner also said that appellate judges were underworked
in the 1950s, so that there was capacity to deal with increased
caseloads without corresponding increases in judgeships.
Finally, Judge Posner cited statistics showing that, at least in
state courts, the volume of appeals has leveled off in recent
years.37
Much of the discussion in the breakout groups—even when
other issues were ostensibly on the table—sheds light on the
correctness of Judge Posner’s assessment. I begin with some

36. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform (Harvard U. Press
1996).
37. See Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts
over the Last Half Century, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 133, 134 (2006). As Judge Posner
noted, state court data were unavailable for the period before 1987. Id.
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general perceptions, then turn to some of the particular
developments on which participants expressed their views.
A. Accommodation or Surrender?
In asserting that courts have accommodated increased
caseloads through changes that enhance judicial productivity,
Judge Posner was actually putting forward two propositions.
Explicitly, he was saying that the various developments that he
listed have, in fact, made appellate judges more productive.
Implicitly, he was saying that this enhanced productivity has
been achieved with little if any harm to other values served by
the system. I did not expect the first proposition to generate
much disagreement, and it did not. I expected the second
proposition to be at least somewhat more controversial, and it
was.
The opposing view was stated forcefully by another
prominent federal appellate judge. (I’ll call this judge “the
dissenting judge.”) The dissenting judge asserted that “there is a
crisis,” and that the shortcuts taken to accommodate the crisis
are “appalling.” Turning to particulars, the dissenting judge said
that in the substantial majority of cases today, there is no oral
argument, and the attorneys, after submitting their briefs and
getting an opinion, have no idea whether anyone read or
understood their contentions. Rather strikingly, this judge
attributed the lack of agitation about the deterioration of the
decisionmaking process to the “docility of the bar.”
I wish I could say unequivocally that there was a consensus
in support of one view or the other, but there was not. My sense
is that there were more who agreed with Judge Posner than those
who disagreed, but certainly there was not unanimity. Moreover,
the reports from the breakout sessions point to a threshold
difficulty in making any kind of overall assessment, namely that
the situation varies enormously from one court to another. Some
judges feel besieged; others feel no more than the ordinary
pressures of an important job in a profession that requires a
certain level of intensity and application.
It is particularly difficult to generalize about state appellate
courts. Each state is different. State supreme courts, most of
which can control their dockets, face far fewer problems than
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state intermediate courts, which are courts of mandatory
jurisdiction. In addition, no state except California and perhaps
Texas had more than a handful of representatives at the
Conference.
Another obstacle to generalization is that, not surprisingly,
lawyers and judges often differed in their assessments. In
particular, judges were generally confident that they have
avoided undue delegation to staff; lawyers tended to have some
doubts.
B. Oral Argument
One of the changes that Judge Posner cited as enhancing
judicial productivity is the curtailment in the frequency and
length of oral argument. These are really two distinct
phenomena, and I shall discuss them separately.
In connection with the denial of oral argument, several
participants pointed out that, at least in the federal courts, a very
large percentage of appeals—more than fifty percent in one
circuit—are filed by pro se litigants. Oral argument is almost
never allowed in those cases, so if you look only at counseled
cases, the drop in oral argument is not nearly as steep as the
overall figures suggest.
How valuable is oral argument? We must distinguish
between instrumental and symbolic purposes. Some participants
emphasized the functional utility of oral argument. There were
several comments to the effect that “mistakes are more likely in
cases that are not orally argued,” in part because “often, the
written briefs are like ships passing in the night.” In a different
vein, a state judge observed: “Oral argument helps to focus the
judges, since they are all hearing the answers to questions at the
same time.” A federal judge said: “It changes the judge’s minds
in five to ten percent of the cases. Also, the level of preparation
by the judges is higher when there is oral argument.” Another
federal judge summarized a widely held reaction:
Oral argument is the first opportunity the judges in [my]
circuit have to “confer” with each other on a case. Often,
there are still questions remaining despite reading the
briefs. But most oral argument is not well done by the
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lawyers. It rarely changes anyone’s mind, but may affect
how the opinion is written.

As this last comment indicates, even judges who saw value
in oral argument also acknowledged its limitations. But judges
and lawyers alike emphasized that oral argument has value even
if it does not affect the decision. A recurring theme is that oral
arguments help to maintain public confidence in the system. A
federal judge said: “Oral argument is important from the
perspectives of making the appellate process visible and making
appellate judges accountable. Otherwise, you could be dead, and
nobody would know it, because you never appear in public.” As
a state judge commented, “Lawyers who have oral argument feel
that they have been heard.” A lawyer added: “It is the one point
of face-to-face contact between the public—especially the
clients—and the appellate judges.” This focus on client
perspective was widely embraced. Several participants said that
if courts offered a choice between having oral argument and
getting a written opinion, lawyers would probably opt for the
opinion, but the client generally would choose the argument.
Does this suggest that courts have gone too far in cutting
back on oral argument? Not necessarily. My sense is that with
the possible exception of some lawyers in the Eleventh Circuit
(and I don’t know if this is a majority view), few of the lawyers
in the breakout groups felt that oral argument had been denied in
a case that they thought really deserved it. But it may be that the
lawyers whose cases are most likely to be sent to a screening
panel without oral argument were under-represented at the
Conference.38 (The Invitations Committee tried very hard to get
them, but those efforts were not always successful.)
Several judges made the point that the decision to forego
oral argument is not always made by the court; sometimes it is
the lawyers who opt to submit the case on the briefs. For
example, a judge on a state intermediate court said that his court
allows oral argument in any case where it is requested, but that it
is now requested in roughly forty percent or less, down from
around sixty percent. Several participants (including lawyers)
criticized the practice of waiving oral argument. Said one: “It’s
hard to believe that anyone who appeals a case doesn’t
38. In particular, there were few lawyers from Public Defender offices, state or federal.
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recognize that he or she is sending a tremendous message to a
court by not requesting argument.”
There was also some interesting discussion of cutbacks in
the length of oral argument. Perhaps not surprisingly, this was
one area where the judges saw things differently from the
lawyers. The judges were confident that they could get what
they needed from oral argument even in ten minutes. They
pointed out that extended argument is unnecessary if both the
judges and the lawyers are well prepared. Several judges also
emphasized that if in the course of argument it became clear that
more time was needed, it would be granted.
In contrast, the lawyers identified a number of problems
with extremely brief arguments. One lawyer said that answering
a single question from a judge could take up the entire allocation
of time. Several lawyers wondered about having to travel long
distances for a brief argument, especially if the judges did not
end up asking any questions.
There was the further question: How much time do the
judges really save by cutting back on the length of argument? A
partial answer is that in courts where some or all judges must
travel to the argument site, there are substantial efficiencies in
reducing the number of weeks of argument, or the number of
days that the judges must be away from their home chambers.
After all, even with laptops, email, and mobile phones, travel
time is surely less productive for judges than time in chambers.
C. Staff Attorneys and Screening
Another of the changes that Judge Posner listed as
“enhancing judicial productivity” is greater use of staff
attorneys. I suspect that many of the Conference participants
who heard that remark wondered: Exactly how does that
happen? If the staff attorneys help the judges to make more
efficient use of the time they spend on cases, that’s one thing.
But if the staff attorneys are doing work that the judges ought to
be doing themselves, that’s something else.
This, too, is an area in which judges and lawyers had
different perceptions. Judges expressed confidence that they are
using staff appropriately and that there is no danger of excessive
delegation based on their current practices. Lawyers were more
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agnostic. I use that word, rather than “skeptical,” because what
lawyers see is that judges are (in their view) making errors or
giving short shrift to appeals. But they have no way of knowing
whether this is because of overdelegation or some other failing.
One of the most important functions of staff attorneys is
that of screening cases for disposition without oral argument.
Judges from several courts emphasized that even after a case has
been placed on the non-argument track, a single judge can
“bump” the case to the argument calendar. Most of the judges
were confident that this backstop avoids undue delegation at the
screening stage. But they acknowledged that there are
differences in the “degree of comfort” with screening practices.
Screening by staff attorneys is by no means universal,
however. Judges in other courts (state and federal) emphasized
they had not delegated the screening function, and that only
judges “decide what track every case is going to go on.” Some
of these judges indicated that they viewed screening by staff as
an improper form of delegation.
Staff screening is often—though not invariably—associated
with staff preparation of draft dispositions. Judges from several
courts took pains to assure lawyers that in cases selected for the
screening track, the staff “doesn’t even begin drafting
dispositive orders until a screening panel has given them
direction about what to do.” But in other courts, staff attorneys
routinely prepare draft dispositions in advance of judicial
consideration.
This latter group includes the largest of the federal courts of
appeals, the Ninth Circuit. The breakout groups at the
Conference included several judges from that court. Based on
their comments and other sources, it is possible to offer a rather
complete picture of the process. Here is the way it works.
A three-judge screening panel meets at the courthouse in
San Francisco. Sometimes one judge will participate by video
conferencing from his or her home chambers in another city.
The staff attorneys present the cases orally, along with a draft
memorandum disposition. The judges can ask questions, and the
record is there on the table for them to leaf through. If the judges
want to see a particular exhibit, the staff can get it for them.
Using this process, a screening panel can dispose of up to sixty
cases in a day. If the panel sits together for a week, as typically
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the panels do, the three judges can dispose of 300 cases. As in
other courts, a single judge can send a case to the argument
calendar.
Some attorneys find it troubling that judges would not read
the briefs and the record in a case, but only a staff memorandum.
In fact, in the Ninth Circuit (and other courts that follow this
approach), the judges do not even read a staff memorandum; the
process is entirely oral. On the positive side, all three members
of the panel focus on the cases at the same time in the same
physical (or occasionally electronic) space. This makes it very
easy for any one judge to express reservations about the
proposed disposition, and, if the judge is not satisfied with the
response, to knock the case off the screening calendar. In
contrast, in a “serial screening” court, the case files are sent to
each of the three judges on the panel in sequence. Perhaps the
judges read the briefs, but there would be no opportunity for
them to discuss the cases, because by the time Judge B looks at
the file, Judge A has long forgotten the case.
Apart from the merits of the various approaches to
screening, participants flagged other concerns raised by the use
of staff attorneys. Judges acknowledged that “staff attorneys
develop expertise in different kinds of cases, and they may
become a little cynical about certain kinds of cases they see
frequently.” “Career staff modifies and changes the work
product” and “tends to allow judges to become more lazy in
their role.” And some lawyer participants had doubts about the
practice itself. As one lawyer said, “Attorneys want a fair
opportunity to persuade the judges of their correctness of their
clients’ position.
Summary dispositions, especially when
screening attorneys are heavily involved, deny attorneys that
opportunity.”
Other attorneys reported “relatively low levels of
indignation about the practice [of screening] on the part of
appellate lawyers who have come to expect it.” But low
expectations may not be the only reason for acceptance. Judges
made a number of points that may help to explain the absence of
indignation:
•

A very large proportion of the cases that are handled
by staff attorneys are pro se cases. The briefs
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probably aren’t going to be very helpful, and in any
event they will certainly benefit from thorough
review by staff attorneys.
•

Many of the appeals (including the counseled
appeals) raise identical issues—issues that may have
been definitively resolved by a previous panel. Use
of staff attorneys enables the court to benefit from
economies of scale.

•

In state intermediate appellate courts, public
defenders “have to operate under the Anders system,”
which means that a high proportion of criminal
appeals are frivolous or nearly so.39

•

Petitions for rehearing help the judges determine if
there are systemic problems with quality.

Judges also offered a number of suggestions for improving
the operation of screening systems and staff attorney offices,
either to enhance efficiency or to avoid undue delegation:
•

Frequent rotation of screening panels produces a
dynamic that keeps both judges and staff attorneys
from falling into a routine that produces too-easy
acceptance of staff recommendations.

•

Regular and frequent turnover among the staff
attorneys serves a similar purpose.

•

Staff attorneys can be particularly useful in handling
non-merits matters that would otherwise take up
judicial time, e.g. attorney’s fee applications.

•

Petitions for rehearing in nonargued cases should be

39. The reference is to Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Under Anders, if counsel
for a criminal defendant “finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That
request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal.” Id. at 744.
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reviewed by a different staff attorney than the one
who worked on the case originally.
The issue of undue delegation to staff was often linked with
concerns about undue delegation to a single judge on the court.
A state judge made the point this way:
There’s a real danger that what’s supposed to be a threejudge process becomes a one law clerk process, because it’s
too easy for a judge to simply adopt the work of a law
clerk, which is then passed along to the other chambers
where judges are likely to essentially rubber stamp. For me
a big part of the job is to figure out which of my
colleagues’ opinions I need to take a closer look at in order
to decide whether I can join it. This is the case in both
argued and non-argued cases.

D. Law Clerks and Opinion Drafting
Appellate judges today depend heavily on assistance from
law clerks, particularly in the drafting of opinions. That is a fact
that no one would deny. But does that kind of delegation pose a
threat to the proper performance of the judicial function? That
question generated extensive discussion in the breakout groups,
with no clear answer.
Several participants—including both judges and lawyers—
pointed out that assistance in drafting is commonplace elsewhere
in the legal profession, particularly in the higher reaches. One
judge asked rhetorically, “Do senior partners in law firms write
their own briefs in all the cases where their names are on the
bottom?” A lawyer in the group expressed agreement:
What you say is so true. It is very strange to me that the
private bar would be so suspicious of [law clerk drafting]
when, at least in large law firms, that’s exactly the way
they prepare the briefs to begin with. One of the reasons I
left a large firm was I was doing the administering and I
never could read the case law myself!

Although the judges described a variety of practices, they
overwhelmingly expressed confidence that they had not
delegated any core judicial functions in the preparation of
opinions. Here are comments by some federal judges:
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•

“Judges [on my court] do use law clerks to do first
drafts of opinions, but judges give those drafts
careful attention.”

•

“I’m comfortable with using a bench memo as the
initial basis for the opinion. After conference I write
an initial memo to the rest of the panel describing in
some detail the panel discussion concerning what we
agreed to do. This memo forms the basis on which a
clerk is to create a draft.”

•

“I use my law clerks to take a ‘first cut’ at tasks like
doing legal research; I retain for myself the ultimate
function of interpreting cases and statutes.”

•

“I find it very useful to have the clerk set out the
pertinent facts, describe the issues raised, and take a
first stab at applying applicable precedent to those
issues. But I do a fair amount of reorganizing of
clerk drafts, I make substantial revisions to almost
every paragraph, and about the only statements of
black-letter law that I may leave untouched are
boilerplate, such as standard of review. In most
opinions there are only a few sentences that are the
key to the analysis, and I almost always am the
ultimate drafter of that language.”

Some judges suggested that the present system may
actually be preferable to the traditional model:
•

“I love to write; I’d rather write than do anything.
[As for reliance on clerks,] I basically rewrite eighty
percent of the average published opinion issued
under my name. There’s a danger in writing the
opinion yourself and then sending clerks off to find
law to support it.” (A federal judge.)

•

“Let’s not lose sight of the fact that it’s not whether
the law clerk provides the first draft (in intermediate
court), or whatever—there are a lot more eyes and
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minds looking at the cases than used to be the case;
this is a large aid in support of the error correction
function; the staffing arrangements work well to
serve that end.” (A state judge.)
There were also different views about how much
importance to attach to the writing of opinions, particularly in
cases that do not involve novel legal issues. One perspective was
expressed by a justice on a state supreme court:
Most of my work is reading intermediate court decisions
and deciding what to decide. The one thing I always read
is the [IAC] opinion. And, not a huge amount of the time
but more than I wish, I read something that leads me to say
to myself, “Judge Smith didn’t read this as closely I have.”
[The reason is that] something is said [in the opinion] about
the facts and how the law in the field works—this puts it a
little too strongly, but [what I see is] a rookie mistake, a
law clerk mistake, that I would expect the judge to have
uncovered. This to a certain extent is due to the difference
between published and unpublished [opinions]; I assume
they read the [draft of a published opinion] in a different
way. But you can see fraying around the edges, maybe in
ways that don’t alter the outcome, but they probably alter
the perspective of the lawyers in that case and their clients
about whether this case did get the appropriate amount of
judicial time.

Perhaps other judges would have the same reaction if they
read opinions as closely, and with as much sensitivity to nuance,
as this participant does. Yet there is another way of looking at
the matter. A state intermediate court judge said:
Some opinions are what a colleague of mine calls a “meat
and potatoes opinion.” If it’s that kind of opinion in an
error-correcting court (and intermediate courts are errorcorrecting courts), no one thinks it makes a damn bit of
difference who writes the opinion if it’s grammatically
correct and legally correct. What difference could it
possibly make? But if it’s a significant case, most judges
will want to write that opinion, just because of the kind of
person that becomes an appellate judge.

In a somewhat similar vein, a federal judge offered these
reflections:
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On the whole, the increased use of law clerks or staff
attorneys has probably not changed the outcomes in many
cases, although it is hard to know for sure. But what is
written on the page—that is, how opinions are worded—is
definitely different than it would be if judges drafted all
opinions. By “different,” I do not necessarily mean
“worse.” The quality of law clerks and staff attorneys is
very high, and, in some chambers, the clerks probably write
better opinions than the judge.
The fact that law clerks and staff attorneys do so much
drafting does not particularly bother me, because I believe
that it is the outcome or the holding of a case that is
important, and not the precise words chosen by the
authoring judge (or law clerk). But this is lost on some
attorneys and trial judges, who put far too much weight on
the precise wording of opinions.

E. Other Aspects of Delegation
Apart from the specific issues raised by screening and the
writing of opinions, have appellate judges, in their efforts to
keep up with their caseloads, gone too far in delegating
responsibility to law clerks and staff attorneys? Would they
necessarily know if they had? We asked the discussion leaders
to put these questions to the judges in their groups.
1. Assessing the Extent of Delegation
Almost every judge emphasized that the amount of
delegation varies greatly from one judge to another, even within
the same court. Some indicated that one or more of their
colleagues might have crossed the line. One state judge said:
Judges on [my court] vary dramatically in how much they
delegate to law clerks. Some almost never read briefs, but
instead rely entirely on summaries prepared by clerks.
Others read every word of every brief. As far as drafting
opinions, most judges ask their law clerks to do initial
drafts. Some judges will edit those drafts substantially;
others will not. In a few extreme cases, judges delegate too
much to their clerks, and the clerks perform core judicial
functions.
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A judge from another state said:
Delegation does vary a lot from judge to judge, but no
judge could survive without doing some delegating. And
you need to pay attention to the people to whom judges are
delegating. In [our state], incoming law clerks are [not paid
enough] to consistently attract the best law school
graduates, especially when student loan debt often exceeds
$100,000. Most of the clerks are pretty good, but some
aren’t, and delegating to them can cause real trouble.

Another state judge said point blank that there is too much
delegation in his court. As evidence, he commented that if he
wants to have a serious conversation about a case, it has to be
with a senior law clerk, not another judge. In a similar vein, a
member of a state supreme court said he has felt for a long time
“that there are staff handling motions from prisons who are
actually making the decisions, which I’m very uncomfortable
with. I try to look at everything that comes before me, but I’m
not sure my colleagues do.”
These expressions were not limited to state judges. A
federal appellate judge offered this assessment:
I do feel that there is too much delegation of difficult cases
to one judge and that judge’s clerks. I also believe that the
nonargued cases clearly are not given the [kind of scrutiny
they should get] by judges, although I see that as less a
problem with those easier cases. Given the volume, it is
difficult to do serious collegial checking on other judges’
work product.

Other judges expressed confidence that their courts had
avoided any undue delegation, although some indicated that the
breaking point might be near. One state judge said simply, “My
court controls the staff, not the other way around.” Another state
judge commented: “The ultimate responsibility of any decision
issued out of my chambers is with me. I look at the [material]
that’s presented to me and give it further review and
consideration as necessary.” A federal judge spoke in similar
terms: “Although we get substantial assistance from staff in
screening and preparing cases, each judge fully informs himself
and makes his own best decision on the law and the facts.” But a
state judge emphasized the cost of avoiding undue delegation:
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Our court has resisted going down the road of delegating
responsibility. Just about every facet of the work, including
screening, stays in the hands of judges. The problem is that
we end up with backlogs of opinions, and so we’re
struggling to find ways to remain “hands on” while
avoiding the problems of delay. We’ve tried mediation but
sometimes the lawyers don’t want to do it.

Another state judge went even further, saying: “My
problem is not delegating too much, but rather that I don’t
delegate enough. I essentially have no life outside the court.”
2. Keeping Delegation within Proper Bounds
How would judges know if they have gone too far in
delegating elements of the judicial function? Some participants
said that it is impossible to find objective benchmarks—perhaps
even to answer the question at all. One judge added (in a
comment that was echoed in other groups): “Delegation happens
bit by bit, one step at a time, and each incremental delegation is
rationalized. By the time the delegation has become excessive,
it’s too late.”
Nevertheless, there were a number of comments that,
explicitly or implicitly, suggested ways of monitoring delegation
and keeping it within proper bounds. Some participants pointed
to possible quantitative measures. One lawyer raised the
question whether the business school literature on “span of
control” might be applied to judicial chambers. Management
literature, the lawyer added, “indicates that eight direct reports is
at the limit of one person’s span of control.” But probably very
few appellate judges supervise as many as eight subordinates,
even including secretaries. A federal judge put the limit much
lower: “I don’t think any judge can give meaningful supervision
to more than three law clerks. More than three would spread the
judge too thin.”
Other participants, at least implicitly, rejected numeric
measures. One lawyer noted that, in her practice, she confronts
the issue of how many associates she can responsibly supervise.
She said that “one knows when one gets to the point that”
delegation has gone too far.
Beyond this, the discussions in the various groups made
clear that the question “how can a judge know when he or she
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has gone too far?” cannot be completely separated from the
question of what constitutes a core judicial function in an
appellate court. And the latter is as much open to debate as the
former. Even individual judges may have some ambivalence as
to where the line should be drawn. For example, one federal
appellate judge said, “When I first started [on the federal bench],
I felt that editing the law clerks’ work was cheating. Now I
accept that I am an editor.”
One group’s discussion is particularly interesting. Several
judges in the group pointed out that “there are lots of internal
pressures to give judges incentives to take responsibility for
fully preparing for each case.” As one federal judge in the
group put it, each member of his court feels the need to be fully
prepared in order to avoid “letting your colleagues down.”
These comments tie in with the state judge’s remark,
already quoted, to the effect that if he wants to have a serious
conversation about a case, it has to be with a senior law clerk,
not another judge. The common thread is that an appellate court
can go a long way toward controlling delegation by providing
frequent occasions for the judges to demonstrate to one another
that they have actually thought through the issues presented by
the cases and are not simply accepting the conclusions of law
clerks. Probably that is not difficult to do when cases are orally
argued, even for ten minutes. But screening-docket cases, at
least in most courts, would not easily lend themselves to this
preventative.
3. Delegation and Transparency
A recurring theme in the breakout sessions was that when
lawyers do not know much about the way in which appellate
judges use their law clerks and staff attorneys, the lawyers often
assume the worst. Thus, in group after group, the participating
lawyers repeated the call for greater transparency in the internal
processes of appellate courts.
The belief in the value of transparency is not grounded
solely in concerns about overdelegation. On the contrary, it also
implicates the issues discussed in Part II about the politicization
of appellate courts. One lawyer explicitly linked the two themes:
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What we need is greater transparency in the processing of
cases which would acknowledge the responsibility given to
staff. “Just trust us” is not a sufficient argument to support
judicial independence in the current political climate, and
appellate courts need to find ways to make their processes
more visible and understood in order to defeat the popular
perception that judging is as personal as legislating.

Transparency can have other benefits as well, as a colloquy
in one group highlights. A state judge in the group expressed
skepticism about how helpful it would be to get “attorney input
about the internal policies of the court.” He continued:
Most of what [our court] does internally it does as a matter
of necessity. If attorneys were to say, for example, “we
don’t like all of this delegation to law clerks,” the court
could do little more than respond, “We don’t like it either,
but we don’t have much choice.”

This prompted a state judge from another state to comment:
“One thing that might come out of increased transparency is the
bar pushing the legislature to provide more resources to the
court so that some objectionable internal practices will no longer
be necessary.”
Transparency also has a practical side, as the discussion in
another group emphasized. As summarized by the Reporter:
“The lawyers felt that they could deal with any system as long as
it was transparent and they knew who actually would decide
how their appeal would be handled. That knowledge would
permit them to tailor their arguments to the decisionmaker.”
What does transparency mean, and how can courts do more
to promote it? Participants described several measures that they
viewed as successful or planned to undertake:
•

“[Our state] has an active bench-bar committee. It
provides a forum for frank exchanges between the
bench and bar about how the courts are functioning.
It’s been very helpful.” (A state judge.)

•

“In [our state], after a meeting at which the bar gave
negative feedback about the use of summary
dispositions, judges stopped issuing them.
Transparency is helpful not only to get input about
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specific practices but to increase confidence in the
work of the courts.” (Another state judge.)
•

“The decision whether or not to publish is a resource
issue. The judges on my court simply cannot write a
full-blown published opinion in every case. They
have to pick and choose. The judges spend time on
the most important cases, and the others are largely
delegated to staff attorneys. [My state’s] appellate
courts plan to be more transparent about this process
and invite attorneys to speak up if they have better
ideas.” (Another state judge.)

•

“The circuit judges [in our circuit] travel around the
circuit and meet with attorneys to talk about
procedures.” (A lawyer.)

•

“One of the best parts of a conference like this is
hearing judges tell how things actually get done,
which provides some reassurance.” (Another
lawyer.)

Admittedly, these ideas are hardly earth-shaking. But on
the evidence of the breakout sessions, it is clear that many
lawyers feel that state and federal appellate courts do not
sufficiently explain such matters as how they handle their
caseloads, what responsibilities are allocated to staff, and (in the
words of the lawyer quoted earlier) why judging is not “as
personal as legislating.” At the same time, judges may be relying
on an exaggerated sense of what lawyers know and how much
courts disclose about their processes.
I note, too, that not all judges were equally enamored of
transparency. Perhaps there was a concern that transparency will
create a sense of entitlement. As one judge said, “If you tell [the
lawyers] what the process is, the lawyers will want to argue
about it.” But most of the judges agreed that greater
transparency would benefit courts as well as lawyers.
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F. Technology and Appellate Processes
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner listed “advances in
information technology” as one of the reasons that appellate
courts have been able to “accommodate” increases in caseload
without strain. In describing the reaction of Conference
participants, it is useful to divide these advances into four
categories: electronic documentation; video conferencing and
argument; video-recorded testimony; and other technologies.
1. Documents in Electronic Form
“Electronic documentation” is a shorthand for the new
technologies that allow lawyers to submit their briefs and the
record in electronic form. In many appellate courts today, the
medium of preference is the CD-ROM. As one lawyer
explained, a hyperlinked brief and electronic record on a CD
permit the reader “to move with a single click from a statement
of supposed fact set forth in a brief directly to the relevant
portion of the record.”
Electronic documentation aroused almost universal
enthusiasm among the Conference participants; this is one
development that enhances quality as well as productivity. Two
interrelated points were discussed in the various groups.
First, when the record and briefs are submitted via CD,
judges and their law clerks can readily check assertions or
quotations in briefs against the record. This allows the court to
detect misstatements by the parties; as one participant observed,
it enables the judges to “keep the attorneys honest.”
Interestingly, one federal judge expressed the suspicion that
such misstatements might be on the increase because attorneys
think judges will be too hard pressed to notice them:
We’re actually hoping [that hyperlinks] will keep lawyers a
little more honest about their citations. That’s a problem
I’ve noticed from volume as well. We’re getting some good
lawyers who have good reputations, and I tend to think
sometimes they fudge on the record in rather a cynical view
that judges are so busy they won’t catch it.

Second, electronic documentation enhances the accuracy of
appellate decisionmaking. As summarized by one Reporter,
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it allows judges to reach a more informed decision by
having more ready access to the evidence in the case.
Moreover, with the ability to do term searches through the
record, rather than sifting through boxes of transcripts and
other documents, it is easier for judges to catch relevant
portions of the record that attorneys may have missed.

Electronic documentation can perform a similar function
with respect to the precedent-focused aspects of decisionmaking.
Links to decisions bearing on the legal issues raised on appeal
can be included in the briefs, so that the judges have immediate
access to all of the authorities the brief relies on. Taking this one
step further, a federal judge reported that his judicial assistant
“can change the citations in his draft opinions into hyperlinks, so
that the other judges on the panel can easily look up the cases
cited.” This too saves judges’ time.
The discussion did point to some downsides of these
widely supported uses of technology by courts. To the extent
that technology makes it much easier for courts to do their own
independent investigation into the evidence or facts of the case,
some lawyers are concerned that the judges will “take over their
cases.” One lawyer expressed concern that “furnishing a brief in
electronic form makes it easy for a judge to use large portions of
the brief in the opinion.” The lawyer found that worrisome. As
for term-searching in electronic documents, some participants
commented that it becomes quite easy to miss relevant material
if you don’t use the right search term. On the whole, though, the
participants strongly favored interactive briefs and other forms
of electronic documentation.
2. Argument and Conferencing by Video or Telephone
In contrast to electronic documentation, the use of video
transmission for oral argument and conferencing generated more
negative than positive comments. The lawyers in particular
emphasized the downside. One Reporter summarized the
reaction of the lawyer participants: “Argument via
videoconference is awkward in that it can be difficult to have
visual contact with all the judges. In addition, the procedure
denies lawyers the non-verbal cues that they get from the judges
when the judges and the attorneys are assembled in the same
location.”
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Some judges joined in these expressions of dislike, but
others were more supportive of the practice. Here are some of
the points that they made:
•

In one federal circuit, some senior judges are now
offering to hear a certain number of appeals if they
have to travel to the seat of court, but a greater
number of appeals if they can stay home and
participate via two-way video. It is hard for the court
to insist on physical presence in those cases.

•

In another circuit, when severe winter storms have
made travel especially difficult or unsafe,
videoconferencing (or even teleconferencing) has
allowed the court of appeals to be able to proceed
with arguments from remote locations instead of
postponing argument.

•

In one state, the appellate courts use
videoconferencing quite a bit. The judges and
lawyers in that state are widely dispersed
geographically. Videoconferencing saves judges and
attorneys considerable time and expense.

It is noteworthy that all of these comments rely on special
circumstances of one sort or another. They do not suggest that
argument or conferencing via video would be desirable
otherwise.
Indeed, throughout the groups, the participants identified
only a single benefit from holding argument by video: It saves
money for lawyers and their clients. As one federal judge said,
“An attorney in [a distant city in the circuit] with a small case
before the [Court of Appeals] appreciates not having to travel to
[the seat of court] for oral argument.” In a similar vein, some
lawyers commented that alternatives to in-person argument can
be useful “where clients cannot afford to pay for attorneys to
travel to a distant court.” But observations like these were
outnumbered by comments emphasizing the value of having
judges and lawyers physically present in court for oral
arguments.
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Telephonic arguments aroused even greater dissatisfaction.
As one lawyer said, “I cannot imagine presenting an oral
argument without seeing the judges’ faces.” In one group, the
lawyers generally agreed that they would rather delay the
decision of a case than have a telephone argument, unless that is
all that was available.
Overall, it seems clear that argument and conferencing by
video or telephone can not be counted among the technologies
that have enabled appellate judges to “accommodate” their
increased caseloads. These forms of technology are not widely
used; they are widely disliked; and (with the possible exception
of the comment about senior judges), no one suggested that they
enhance judges’ productivity.40
3. Video Recording of Trial Testimony
Several of the groups discussed a form of technology that is
not yet in widespread use and may never be: video recording of
trial proceedings to supplement (or replace) the written
transcript. Two questions predominated. Would appellate judges
have the time to watch recordings of witness testimony? And
would the use of video recordings alter the standard of appellate
review?
Most of the participants who spoke to the first question
expressed doubt that judges would want to take the time
required to view video recordings of testimony. For example,
one state judge said, “If you want to really see what [a particular
witness] had to say, you’ve got to watch it in real time, and
that’s a very laborious way of going about it.” Another state
judge agreed, saying that his state had considered adopting the
practice, but “one of the reasons that ultimately our supreme
court rejected that as an appropriate medium is because it was so
tedious for appellate judges, clerks or whoever’s watching it, to
watch it in real time.” A few participants spoke more positively,
40. I must admit to some surprise there was not more support for video arguments from
judges, particularly judges who must otherwise travel to the seat of court for oral arguments. As I have already observed, even with all of the benefits of modern technology,
travel time is surely less productive for judges than time in chambers. To the extent that
judges can participate in oral argument from their home city, they are gaining in efficiency.
The explanation, I suppose, is that judges value the visual contact and the non-verbal cues
(from their colleagues as well as from counsel) as much as lawyers do.
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emphasizing that “you don’t have to watch the whole
proceeding; you can watch on limited issues.” But that was a
minority view. As one participant said, “Judges can read
transcripts much faster than they can watch a recording of
testimony. A judge may, out of curiosity, occasionally want to
look at a recording, but, in the vast majority of cases, judges will
want to stick to transcripts.”
There was no consensus on whether the use of video
recordings would alter the standard of appellate review. One
lawyer expressed the concern that with the ability to view trial
proceedings, “appellate judges may start substituting their
judgment about the credibility of witnesses for the judgment of
trial judges.” Another lawyer foresaw “a new standard of
review” with the equivalent of “instant replay” in Monday night
football. A state judge spoke in similar terms of the prospect of
“de novo review” of factual findings if appellate judges watch
trial videos.
That was probably not the majority view, however. Several
participants emphasized that deference given to factual findings
by trial judges is not based solely on the trial judge’s ability to
see the witnesses, but also on other considerations, including
division of labor, pressures of volume, and tradition. Participants
in several groups discussed the experience of Kentucky, which
for some years has used only a videotaped record. A judge from
another state reported that Kentucky appellate judges have said,
“Well, I just tell myself that it’s not my job [to evaluate
credibility], and then I don’t.” In another group, a participant
said that empirical studies of the Kentucky practice “have found
no effect on the degree of deference trial court findings of fact
receive on appeal.”
4. Other Technologies
There was very little discussion in the breakout groups of
the well-established technologies that undoubtedly have enabled
appellate judges to handle a larger volume of cases than they
could in 1975 without loss of quality. Primary among these are
the three mentioned at the outset of this article: electronic legal
research, word processing, and email. A few participants did
note the transformation. For example, a state judge said:
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Before word processing was introduced, judges [on my
court] had to prepare an original and eight carbon copies of
an opinion. [Other judges] were loathe to ask for changes,
simply because changing an opinion was such a logistical
nightmare. Now there is a lot more input from judges on
[opinions prepared by their colleagues].

Judges from some courts, notably the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, also noted the value of computerized case
management—for example, in facilitating the efficient handling
of multiple cases raising similar issues.
Electronic legal research, word processing, and email have
been in near-universal use for quite some time. But with the
exception of electronic documentation, none of the newer
technologies discussed by the participants seem to offer any real
prospect of further enhancing judges’ productivity. Does this
mean that, at least in the technologically advanced courts, the
ceiling has been reached, and there is no room for additional
improvement? History tells us that it would be rash to proclaim
the end of invention. Yet as comments by some participating
judges implicitly suggest, there is a limit to the number of cases
that a judge can actually understand and personally decide in a
given number of hours or days. Beyond that point, technology
cannot increase productivity.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
In one of the breakout groups, as already reported, a state
supreme court justice confidently told the other participants that
when a conflict develops between panels of the state’s
intermediate courts, “the supreme court will take the case.”
Meanwhile, in another group, a judge from one of those
intermediate courts was saying, “It is a problem when
intermediate courts in the state have conflicts that are not
resolved by our supreme court.” One could hardly find a better
illustration of how the same reality can look very different to
different actors in the system.
Another illustration comes from one of the Reporters. The
topic was undue delegation:
Judges tended to “circle the wagons” on this issue. They
insisted, without exception, that they are conscious of the
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need to avoid undue delegations to staff. On the other hand,
they couldn’t identify any benchmarks that could be used to
determine whether delegation has become excessive.
Nevertheless, they were convinced that none of them had
reached, or were even close to reaching, the point of undue
delegation to staff.
The reaction of the attorneys was very different. There was
a pervasive sense among the lawyers that many appeals
aren’t getting the time and attention they deserve from the
judges. Not surprisingly, as outsiders, lawyers weren’t able,
for the most part, to say whether it was excessive
delegation to staff that caused the problems they see with
appellate decisionmaking. They tended to look at external
indicia of those sorts of problems.

But perceptions are not necessarily fixed. Recall the
comment by a lawyer in another group: “One of the best parts of
a conference like this is hearing judges tell how things actually
get done, which provides some reassurance.”
As Arthur England notes in his Introduction, one of the
goals of the Conference organizers was to encourage
“continuing discussions among those immersed in and most
affected by the appellate justice systems.”41 In my view, that
continuing discussion can be most effective if focused on
particular states or courts. The Florida Bar has already taken the
lead by sponsoring an “Appellate Justice Conference” focused
on the state’s District Courts of Appeal.42 Earlier (and
independent of the National Conference), the University of
Arizona College of Law sponsored a symposium about the
Ninth Circuit.43
Discussions at the 2005 National Conference suggest that a
promising subject for such an examination is the Eleventh
Circuit. Participants in at least six of the breakout groups voiced
concerns about that court; these concerns centered on the size of
the court’s legal staff, the extensive use of visiting judges, and

41. England, supra n. 2, at 69.
42. A full account of the conference should be available soon at the web site of the Appellate Practice Section of The Florida Bar, http://www.flabarappellate.org/.
43. See Arthur D. Hellman, Toni M. Massaro & Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Conference: Introduction, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 221 (2006).
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the “screening box” approach to routine cases.44 But at one of
the plenary sessions, a judge of the court strongly defended the
court’s practices. Moreover, it is clear that with respect to one of
the concerns—visiting judges—the perceptions have
outdistanced the reality.45 A conference might provide
“reassurance,” or it might alarm lawyers even more. But I have
no doubt that a “candid assessment of the realities and directions
of . . . appellate justice”46 in the Eleventh Circuit would benefit
the court as well as its constituents. It might also produce
insights that would be helpful to other courts whose practices
have generated concerns among lawyers and judges.
The participants in the 2005 National Conference on
Appellate Justice shared a great deal of information with one
another. This included perceptions as well as facts—the former
perhaps as important as the latter. I hope that this Report, by
making that information available to a wider audience, will
encourage other organizations to provide additional
opportunities for judges and lawyers to exchange views and
experiences with the aim of improving the system of appellate
justice in the various states and circuits.

44. I have expressed similar concerns. See Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing Judgeship
Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. App.
Prac. & Process 239, 253-60 (2003).
45. One participant said that a panel of three active circuit judges “is unheard of”; another said that “about fifty percent of all panels have at least one visiting judge.” Both
statements are exaggerations (though the second is not far from reality if one considers
only published opinions).
46. England, supra n. 2, at 69.
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APPENDIX—DISCUSSION LEADERS AND REPORTERS
GROUP

DISCUSSION LEADER

REPORTER

1

Charles A. Bird

Carol Ann T. Mooney

2

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr.

William M. Richman

3

Mark R. Kravitz

J. Clark Kelso

4

James C. Martin

Patrick J. Schiltz

5

Eric J. Magnuson

Stephen L. Wasby

6

Luther T. Munford

Lauren K. Robel

7

Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain

Chad M. Oldfather

8

Craig T. Enoch

Gerald F. Uelmen

9

Sanford Svetcov

William L. Reynolds

10

Deanell Reece Tacha

Stephen F. Smith

11

John Charles Thomas

Robert H. Klonoff

12

Roger D. Townsend

Joan E. Steinman

13

Martha C. Warner

Carl W. Tobias

